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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
”Mass media reaches not only people's homes, but also their minds, shaping 
their thoughts and sometimes their behaviour” said Jamie Metzl, Executive 
Vice President of the Asia Society. Each of us reads newspapers and watches 
TV in order to find out what is going on in the world. Very often the media 
shapes our world view and influences our opinion very strongly about a 
particular topic. As the media shape the minds of normal people they also 
influence the opinion of the political actors. It is very important to get the 
correct information and it is not always the case if there are not enough 
journalists to provide coverage or if the facts are misinterpreted. 
Africa is one of the poorest areas of the world and also a continent where 
conflict within the countries and between them is always present. It is often 
said that it has been overlooked by the international media. There is media 
coverage but it is either not enough or it is very often misinterpreted. It 
happens because the media face lot of challenges nowadays, especially if the 
humanitarian crises are concerned. 
Even gaining access to some countries is problematic when the government 
put restrictions on international journalists to avoid the coverage.  Another 
problem could be the inexperience of reporters in covering the emergencies. 
(Livingston 1996:69) Journalists are scared to go to places where their lives 
could be in danger and if they decide to go, it takes very long to get all the 
needed documents to get into the country.  
Of course reporting- not on anarchy, though that is what it may look like- 
but on the very unstable, violent, illegal order that may characterize 
modern wars is also hard to do because it is dangerous. More journalists 
have been killed in recent conflicts than ever before, and there is evidence 
that they are more frequently deliberately murdered than in the past. (Jean 
Seaton 1993:56). 
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 It often happens because the head of the governments of the countries very 
often do not wish any “invaders” in their territory. It is also very difficult to 
report from there because of the logistic problems and lack of resources. 
There has always been tension between the media and the policy makers. 
(Gowing 194:2) This paper will show different opinions of policy makers, 
scholars and journalists on the interaction between the actions of the media 
and the policy decision making process in order to clarify this relationship.  
This study  will have a closer look on the role of the media in the decision 
making process of the western political actors with focus on the United States  
in the case of Rwanda, Darfur and Somalia.  
1.1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
This paper will try to answer the questions: 
 What role do the media play in conflict? What kind of impact do they 
have on the policy makers? Does the evidence of recent interventions 
suggest that the media can influence foreign policy? 
The aim of the paper will be to determine whether the media play a significant 
role in influencing the political actors or play only a marginal one. The role of 
the media internationally and locally will be discussed. The focus of this 
paper will be on the interventions in Africa in Rwanda and Darfur but also 
other case studies like Somalia and Iraq will be discussed. Media coverage 
will be analyzed and compared.  These two have been chosen in order to find 
out if the media have learned anything from the genocide in Rwanda and 
improved their work during the genocide in Darfur.  It will be proven that, 
although there was a presence of the international media in Darfur, it did not 
have an impact on the international community and, because of the lack of the 
media coverage during the Rwanda genocide, nothing was done in order to 
save many lives.  This paper proposes the following hypothesis: 
• Mass Media play an important role in forming and reflecting public 
opinion. 
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• If there had been more coverage in places like Rwanda and Darfur, 
public opinion would have been mobilized and politicians would have 
to have reacted faster. 
• The role of the media is important because it affects what the outside 
world does about the conflicts. (Allen 1999:35) 
• If there are more correspondents on the ground with better knowledge 
of the situation the bigger impact has it on the policy-making. 
(Rotberg, Weiss 1996:150)   
There are different factors which influence the state policy decision making 
process with respect to intervention. The level of the emergency assistance in 
the humanitarian crisis is determined by many factors.  First of all it depends 
on the intensity of media coverage. Second, it depends on the degree of 
political interest and the strength of the international organizations and 
humanitarian NGOs. This paper will concentrate mainly on the media factor. 
The aim of this thesis is to show how important the media attention is in 
promoting political action and also what role does it play in the conflict. The 
humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Darfur will be compared and analysis 
drawn upon quantitative and qualitative indicators.  
1.2 Methodology 
 
The analysis of the media coverage in both areas is carried out based on the 
literature. The main focus is on the sources that deal with the role of the 
media in the decision making process. There are not many books that focus 
only on Rwanda and Darfur. For this reason, the study of international 
journals, such as the Economist helped to provide a better understanding of 
the subjects discussed in the paper. In order to see both sides on the coin, i.e. 
not only what is in the literature but also what the representatives from the 
media have to say, the interviews with the international CNN correspondent 
Nick Robertson will be presented. In order to judge if the media coverage was 
present or absent during the genocide, quantitative analysis will be made. The 
number of articles printed in the media during both genocides will be 
analysed using the Lexis-Nexis database. For each of the crises, data on the 
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volume of media coverage will be gathered and presented in the tables and 
graphics. Furthermore, films about Darfur and Rwanda: “Hotel Rwanda”, 
“Sometimes in April” and the documentary “Sand and Sorrow” and “Darfur 
Now” will as well be used as sources for the analysis of the media coverage 
of both conflicts.  
1.3 Structure  
 
In the first section, a theoretical approach will be discussed. The main focus 
will be on the CNN Effect which describes the concept of a direct link 
between media coverage, public opinion and foreign policy. It argues that TV 
and the print media can have a significant impact on the decision making 
process. Furthermore, the conditions under which the media has an influence 
on the conflict will be discussed. In this section, the opinion of different 
scholars will be presented in order to show that there is a lot of disagreement 
as to whether the CNN effect plays an important role in the policy decision 
making process. Different types of the effect will be discussed based on the 
case studies of Somalia and Iraq. 
In the second section the role of the international media coverage of Rwanda 
and the local “Hate media” will be shown. It will be possible to see how 
important or un-important the international media was in raising awareness in 
people around the world. The use of the local media as a tool of genocide will 
be discussed. In order to better understand the conflict, the background will be 
given. It will be proven that the media can play positive but also a negative 
role, as in case of the hate media in Rwanda. The influence of the media on 
the political actors especially the United Nations will not be ignored.  
 In the third section, the analysis of the Darfur coverage will be made. As the 
Darfur conflict is ongoing, it will be interesting to see if the media changed 
their coverage since the outbreak of the conflict. In this section, the role of the 
local media and the Government of Sudan will be presented.  In the fourth 
section the media coverage of Darfur will be compared with Rwanda, based 
on the research on how many articles there were during the both genocides. In 
both sections the outcome of the interview with the journalist’s representative 
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Nick Robertson will be presented and his perspective on the role of the media 
will be shown. The difficulties faced by the journalists in covering both 
conflicts will be analyzed. It will be essential to see if the media have learnt 
anything from their mistakes during the genocide in Rwanda.   
The last fifth section will be a conclusion where the questions set in the 
beginning will be answered. The hypothesis set in the beginning will be 
considered to see if it were correct. 
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2. THEORETICAL APPROACH: CNN EFFECT 
 
With the end of the cold war and new developments in communication 
technology, the media started to play a more important role. In the beginning, 
the phrase ”CNN effect” should be defined. It cannot be confused with the 
synonymous CNN cable network station. Broadly defined, the term “CNN 
effect” means the impact of the TV and the print media on the state policy 
decision making process with respect to intervention and what kind of 
pressure is applied to foreign policy from the media. The first time the CNN 
effect was mentioned was in the Gulf War in 1991. Since the end of the Cold 
War there was an increasing willingness of western actors to intervene where 
there was a humanitarian crisis. A big influence on this change in attitudes 
was the western media. The main aim of this chapter is, by researching the 
CNN Effect, to find out the degree of media influence on the policy-makers 
when they discuss over whether to intervene during the humanitarian crisis. 
This will be done by discussing different case studies where the media had 
impact on the policy or not. Main research was based on the Piers Robinson 
book “The CNN effect” and Rotberg and Weiss “From massacre to genocide” 
but also other author’s views like Jakobsen and Strobel were very significant. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on the case study of Somalia and 
also the role of the media in influencing U.S decision making process during 
this conflict. The different types of CNN effect will be discussed here also. In 
the second section the challenges that media are currently facing will be 
described and also different recommendations on how the coverage could be 
improved will be presented. In the end it will be concluded if according to the 
CNN effect, the media are influencing the policy decision making process or 
not. 
2.1 Somalia 
 
In order to better understand the CNN effect and different types of it, the 
case of Somalia will be discussed and the role of the media in influencing 
policy making process of USA will be presented. 
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In Robinson’s opinion, if a state has a certain policy, the media can not 
change it: when the policy certainty decreases, news media influence 
increases and that, as policy becomes more certain, the influence of news 
media coverage is reduced. (Robinson 2002: 25) 
On the other hand, the media can help political actors promote their policy 
among the society through, for example, press briefings. This is the so called 
policy-media interaction model. Robinson shows in his book “CNN Effect” 
different types of the CNN Effect. They can be strong, weak or impediment. 
When there is a strong effect, it means that the political decision would not 
have been reached without the media impact. In the weak CNN effect, the 
media play only a marginal role during the intervention decisions. In the 
impediment effect, the media can speed up the policy process but do not 
really play an important role. By analysing the case study of Somalia we will 
find out which kind of effect was observed. Robinson argues that: 
the most common explanation put forward for Operation “Restore Hope” 
is that emotive news media coverage of suffering people caused policy-
makers to decide to intervene; in short that the intervention decision was a 
straight-forward case of the strong CNN effect. (Robinson 2002:50). 
 George Bush also admitted that it was the media who motivated him to 
intervene in Somalia: 
Former President Bush conceded Saturday that he ordered US troops into 
Somalia in 1992 after seeing heart-rending pictures of starving waifs on 
television. Bush said that as he and his wife, Barbara watched television at 
the White House and saw “those starving kids. in quest of a little pitiful cup 
of rice” he phoned Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin 
Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Please come over to the 
White House”, Bush recalled telling the military leaders. “I-we-can’t watch 
this anymore. You’ve got to do something. (Robinson 2002:50) 
As we can see the media had an influence on the intervention in Somalia. On 
the one hand the Bush policy towards Somalia was quite certain as he wanted 
to save his face before he left office. Intervention in a failed state was also a 
confirmation of Bush “new world order” vision. Other reason to intervene 
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was also the public response to the failure to act in Bosnia. Consequently, the 
media coverage in Bosnia had an indirect influence on intervention in 
Somalia. On the other hand, the media did play an important role as Bush 
admitted that the media, by showing pictures of starving children, pushed him 
towards the intervention. Mermin writes:  
There is no reason to doubt that the appearance of Somalia on American 
television just before major changes in US policy in August and November 
of 1992 influenced the decision of the Bush administration to act. (Mermin 
1997:386).  
It is hard not to agree with Mermin’s words especially if you look at the 
images and videos shown on the BBC homepage from that time. The media 
coverage not only put pressure on Bush administration but they also 
influenced public opinion.  Shattuck is convinced that media played very 
significant role in the case of Somalia: 
The media are both the cause and effect of new foreign policy challenges. 
They act as a cause in that they bring human suffering into our living rooms 
every hour and drive domestic public opinion. The media got us into 
Somalia and then got us out. (Shattuck 1996:174)  
 According to the policy-media interaction model hypothesis, the news media 
influence is more effective when the policy is uncertain. This could be 
applicable in the case of Somalia. Lot of articles about Somalia were empathy 
framed showing suffering people and starving kids which definitely put more 
pressure on the intervention.  
Even though Robinson is not really convinced that the decision to deploy 
28,000 troops was caused by media attention, he says it definitely contributed 
to mobilising the support for the intervention: 
If, however, the media played any significant role at all vis-à-vis the policy 
process it was an enabler and then as a builder of support. Policy-makers, 
aware of prior sympathy toward the suffering in Somalia amongst 
journalists and the public, could act confidently in the knowledge that an 
intervention could easily be sold to the public. Once the decision was made, 
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positive and pro-intervention coverage helped mobilise support for 
Operation Restore Hope (Robinson 2002:63) 
 Summing up in this case the media played a more supportive role rather than 
pressuring. The CNN Effect in this case could be negotiable. The media 
influence did not make a big difference because of the strong political 
decision of deploying the US troops. Although other opinion represents 
Gowing:  
Yet the pictures of the failed US mission forced President Clinton’s hand 
because of the intense public pressure via Congress. The decision to 
withdraw was made even though at the start of the mission the Pentagon 
had made no clear prediction or assessment of a likely casualty rate, and 
the number which died was less than occassionaly died in routine training 
accidents. But the pictures struck a raw political nerve at a time when the 
administration was uncertain as to whether US troops were still making a 
valuable contribution to the UN aid mission. Clinton and his advisers were 
split on whether to keep troops in Somalia or withdraw them. (Gowing 
1994:68). 
 Natsios  gives example for when is more probable for US to intervene: 
Policy makers will actively support an early and robust government 
humanitarian response to a complex humanitarian emergency if it threatens 
the geopoliticial interests of the United States. Electronic and print media 
attention will be tangential or irrelevant to the decision, whether or not the 
United States intervenes. (Natsios 1996:153) In his opinion American 
media coverage of complex emergencies is likely to continue to be limited, 
random, and unreliable. An early warning system based on the media 
would be costly, with no profitable consequence for investors, particularly 
if early warning were not successful in avoiding calamity. The 
international media presence in the field is simply not sufficient to provide 
the early warning needed to alert international opinion in a timely fashion. 
(Natsios 1996:164) 
In the case of Somalia, it is likely that the USA would still have intervened 
even without the media coverage but there is no doubt that the media 
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coverage enabled policy-makers to intervene by building support for action. 
Also because of the non-existence of US political interest in the region and no 
geo-strategic concerns, it can be concluded that the intervention was driven by 
the media, in a significant if not strong way. In order to find out which kind of 
‘CNN effect’ took place in the case of Somalia, this section will have a closer 
look on the different types of CNN effect. 
Steven Livingson divides the CNN effect into three categories. He says that 
we may speak of the CNN effect as: 
1) Policy agenda-setting 
2) An impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals 
3) Accelerant to policy decision-making (Livingston 1997:2) 
Somalia is an example of policy-agenda setting. The United States’ policy 
priorities were changed because of the emotional and compelling media 
coverage of the humanitarian crisis occurring in Somalia.  In the accelerant 
case the decision might be sped up because of the media influence.  
Former Secretary of State James A. Baker, highlights this understanding of 
the CNN effect. “The one thing it does” he says “is to drive policymakers to 
have a policy position. I would have to articulate it very quickly. You are in a 
real-time mode. You don’t have time to reflect” (James.A.Baker cited in 
Livingston 1997:3) 
 In this case, media coverage of a crisis might shorten the time taken in the 
process of making the decision if enough pressure is put on the politicians. 
They have less time to consider the policy changes and so their decisions are 
influenced. Media have speeded up the decision on intervention. The last 
type, the impediment effect, has also been mentioned by Robinson and is a 
more psychological and emotional influence. It shows the effect of the media 
on the public opinion and their possible support or opposing to war. A good 
example is the effect that the pictures of dead American soldiers dragged 
through the streets in Mogadishu had on the American people, forcing Bill 
Clinton to withdraw the troops.  
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Pictures of the American soldiers might make the American public 
“madder” (Livingston 1997:6) 
Somalia example shows that CNN effect had a supportive role in influencing 
the decisions on intervention. Peter Jakobson in his article “Counter Point: 
Focus on CNN effect misses the point” has made a critique of the role of the 
news media with regard to humanitarian action. He argues that: 
By ignoring conflicts during the pre and post violence phases and by being 
highly selective in its coverage of conflicts in the violence phase, the 
media helps to shift focus and funds from more cost-effective long-terms 
efforts, directed at preventing violent conflict and rebuilding war-torn 
societies, to short-term emergency relief. It also creates a situation where 
the provision of emergency relief to a large extent is determined by factors 
that have nothing to do with humanitarian need. (Jakobsen2000:132).  
Jakobsen analyses the CNN effect in three stages: pre-violence phase, 
violence phase and post violence phase.  
 In his opinion during the pre-violence phase, the impact of media 
coverage on conflict management is negligible for two reasons. First the 
media usually fails to take an interest in conflicts before violence or mass 
starvation kills a large number of people. Second, governments tend to 
ignore calls for preventive action when media coverage does occur. 
(Jakobsen 2000:132)  
In his opinion pre and post violence phase is very important as far as the 
media coverage is concerned. 
It is hard for an event to get media attention because there are so many 
ongoing conflicts all over the world. For this reason, the impact of the media 
in the pre-violence phase is negligible. The media influence is bigger in the 
violence phase but it still very limited and selective.  We ask ourselves the 
question of why the media cover one conflict more than another. It is obvious 
that the crisis must be dramatic and photogenic and the bloody war will 
trigger a larger audience. Jakobsen also says that “the CNN effect only comes 
into play when Western governments oppose military intervention in conflicts 
where massive human rights violations occur” (Jakobsen 2000: 134). 
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This essay does not necessarily agree with that. As we have seen in the case 
of Somalia, the US government did not really oppose intervention and was 
considering taking action and the media pushed them in the direction of 
intervention. Jakobsen also expressed his doubts as to whether the CNN effect 
may force the government to withdraw against their will. In the case of 
Somalia, Clinton had decided to withdraw after the US soldiers were killed. 
The dragging of bodies through the streets of Mogadishu shown on TV 
definitely sped up the process of withdrawal but without them, Clinton would 
have probably still decided to withdraw the troops. 
In the post-conflict phase, the media impact is usually very little. If the 
intervention succeeded, the media usually loses the interest.  Kofi Annan said: 
“The CNN factor” tend to mobilize pressure at the peak of the problem- 
which is to say, at the very moment when effective intervention is most 
costly, most dangerous and least likely to succeed (Annan cited in 
Jakobsen 2000:138)  
The former Secretary General is suggesting that the interventions caused by 
the media rarely succeed. By the time the conflict is occurring and is covered 
by the media, the opportunity to avoid the disaster is lost. The media 
influence is definitely weaker in the post conflict than in the violence phase 
simply because there is less coverage. 
 In the view of other UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros-Ghali the impact 
of television is really great:  
“Today the media do not simply report the news. Television has become 
part of the event it covers. It has changed the way the world reacts to 
crises. Public emotion becomes so intense that United Nations work is 
undermined. On television, the problem may become simplified and 
exaggerated” (Boutros-Ghali cited in Gowing 1994:16). 
Apart from the above described examples, the media also play a very 
important role in influencing public opinion. Gowing suggests that public 
opinion is even more important than the TV images: 
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 If politicians are to be believed, public opinion plays a more defining role 
than TV. Ministers claim they rely more on their instinctive sense of the 
likely public and political reaction to the TV images than the impact of the 
images both on themselves and close officials. Is the ministerial 
explanation is accepted, then TV images drive public opinion just as they 
dive the newspaper columnists. In turn, public opinion(or lack of) drives(or 
neutralizes) policy decisions. (Gowing 1994:27) 
 In this case the media maybe do not have a direct impact on the ministers but, 
by influencing the public opinion, they influence in the same time the 
government. Other scholars like Gilboa says that: 
 
leaders have always used the press particularly the “elite newspapers” to 
obtain information and insights on other countries and world affairs but 
global television has become a much more dramatic and powerful source. 
The faster pace of diplomatic exchanges conducted on global television 
alters standard decision- making processes, particularly in acute crisis 
situation. (Gilboa 2002:736). 
 He thinks that the media have always been very important for political 
leaders and now TV plays very important role in decision making processes. 
Natsios suggests that: 
 CNN effect has taken on more importance than it deserves as an 
explanation for responses emanating from the policy- making process in 
Washington. In its crudest form the CNN effect suggests that policy-
makers only respond when there are scenes of mass starvation on the 
evening news. (..) The truth is that most complex emergencies receive little 
media coverage at any stage. Usually it is when the disaster response is 
unsuccessful and people die that serious coverage occurs. (Natsios 
1996:150) 
 
 It is noticeable that there are different opinions about the importance of the 
CNN effect in the conflict intervention. Some scholars are convinced that the 
media play very significant role and some that their role is only marginal. The 
case study described in the next chapter will give us a better understanding of 
the CNN effect and how powerful it is.  
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2.2 Northern Iraq 1991  
 
The Iraq media coverage was the first time that the media coverage of an 
event went to twenty four hours a day. In the first Iraq war, the US policy was 
very certain. Bush administration was set against involvement in Iraq.  First, 
when the flow of Kurdish refugees to southern Turkey began, this had a 
bigger influence on the Bush policy than the media. Here, the media itself 
helped to push the US government to intervene and set up the refugee camps 
but did not have a strong CNN effect. 
By 19 April, US TV news was reporting meetings between US and Iraqi 
generals in northern Iraq aimed at finalising an agreement for US troops to 
set up refugee camps within Iraq. At this point US, French and British 
forces started moving in significant numbers beyond the Iraq-Turkey 
border and into Iraq in order to police the refugee camps.(..) In short, 
media coverage functioned to highlight the plight of the suffering Kurds 
through empathy framing and was deeply critical of the Bush 
administration’s policy toward the crisis. (Robinson 2002:69)  
The coverage here was extensive and empathetic. The question was whether 
Operation “Provide Comfort” was motivated by the media coverage? 
According to the policy-media interaction model, media influence will not 
occur if the state has a certain policy and that was the case in Iraq. Even 
though the pictures of the flow of Kurdish refugees might have had an impact 
on decision of intervention by the USA, Brent Scowcroft argues that:  
Without Turkey factored in, with just television pictures, I don’t know 
what our response would have been. We were very sensitive to Turkey’s 
anxiety about allowing the Kurds to stay. That was fundamentally what 
motivated us. (Livingston 1997:10)  
The Kurdish crisis was on the headlines of the news for a long time. But it 
was more the geo–strategic concerns than the media coverage that pushed the 
US to intervene. 
 Robinson argues that the intervention was not influenced by the media.  
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It is contended here that, given Turkey’s membership of NATO, its loyalty 
(particularly during the Gulf War) to the US and its ongoing “problem” 
with Kurdish separatists in southern Turkey, geo-strategic concerns rather 
than media-inspired humanitarian intent or media-public relations are 
sufficient to explain the intervention. (Robinson 2002:71) 
In the case of Iraq in 1991 the CNN effect was rather weak. The intervention 
would have taken place, even if the media did not cover it.  It is still very 
important to mention that media helped to build public support for action. 
After having looked at the both case studies of Somalia and Iraq we can see 
that the CNN effect can be strong and weak. There is no doubt that the media 
play a significant role in influencing the decision on intervention. 
2.3 Media coverage and its challenges 
 
Before starting to criticize media coverage of the current conflicts, it is 
important to have a closer look at the challenges the journalists involved in 
the coverage are facing. A very interesting source of information on the topic 
of the role of the media in conflict is the book: “From Massacre to Genocide”. 
This book gathers opinions of different scholars and journalists who discuss 
how the media do and should behave in the field and how the covering should 
be improved in order to have a stronger influence on the policy-making in 
humanitarian crises. 
In the opinion of Cate, media have very strong and important role in 
motivating political actors. 
The media as a group, and particularly television, have grown up to be the 
most powerful force in American political and social life. Few causes or 
events, no matter how dramatic they are or how many people are involved; 
motivate powerful governmental or institutional responses until captured 
by the cameras of the press. (Cate1996:18).  
There are a lot of challenges that the media have to face in covering the 
conflicts. Even gaining access to some countries is problematic when the 
government of the problematic countries put restrictions on international 
journalists to prevent coverage. Another problem can be the inexperience of 
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reporters in covering emergencies. Secondly, it can be really difficult to get 
access to victims. As mentioned in the beginning of this work, there is a big 
problem of interpretation and accuracy. If journalists do not have enough 
background information on the region and the conflict they are covering, the 
coverage will not be accurate. Journalists are also expected to transform 
information as soon as possible to the TV headquarters but that is not always 
possible Gilboa notes: 
 The global all- news Television networks apply pressure on their 
correspondents to file reports as soon as they arrive in a relevant location. 
Often reporters may be able to transmit the pictures, but may not know the 
context and the meaning of events and don’t have time to absorb, reflect 
and explain what they see. Consequently reports may be incomplete, 
disorted and even misleading, and leaders who watch them believing they 
are complete and accurate and using them as their principal source of 
information may adopt wrong policies. (Gilboa 2002:738)  
In case of the crisis accuracy of information is very important as the 
information that is given by the journalist are influencing world leaders 
decisions. 
The power of the public communications poses important issues about the 
capacity of such communications to misinform, distort, and mis-focus 
attention. Accuracy is one of the most important concerns about media 
reports, particularly when distance and time constraints combine to reduce 
the opportunity for first-hand evaluation and thorough fact-checking. (Cate 
1996:24) 
 As the western media often lack detailed information about the developing 
countries and the ongoing conflicts, this can very often lead to a 
misinterpretation of the facts. Another problem is that reporters are not 
working alone but they have editors and producers in headquarters offices to 
which they have to sell their story and draw their attention. 
Girardet raised also another question of humanitarian aid organizations 
lacking will to help journalists in dangerous locations? They are not always 
willing to help as their access to some areas might be limited by the local 
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authorities. Sometimes the directors of aid agencies refuse to give some more 
information which makes things harder for journalist. Rotberg and Weiss give 
following recommendations how to improve the media coverage of the 
complex emergencies: 
-The media should become more knowledgeable about humanitarian issues. 
-Journalists should encourage their editors and publishers to extend coverage 
of humanitarian issues. 
-International media should support local media institutions and journalists. 
-Aid organizations should develop sophisticated communications strategies. 
-Specialist targeting of materials and other niche marketing skills should be 
employed. 
-Policy-makers should not let the media or humanitarian organizations set or 
pre-empt the agenda. Time and resources spent in educating the public over 
the long term will help reduce the problems of managing public opinion in 
crises. (Rotberg, Weiss 1996:187) 
Therefore, before criticizing the media and the reporters for not doing their 
jobs properly, we should take into consideration the challenges they are facing 
in covering the dangerous areas like Rwanda, Somalia or Darfur. Those above 
mentioned recommendations might help in strengthening the role of the media 
in influencing the policy decision making process. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Summing up the view of some scholars, such as Robinson, the media can 
play quite important role by generating public pressure which can force 
western government to take action or speed the process of intervention. 
Others, like Livingston and Eachus, claim that: 
 The roles of the professional policy expert and diplomat have been 
undermined by the media. To the degree that foreign policy is reactive to 
news content, the key decisions are those made by reporters, producers, 
22 
 
and editors. In this view, foreign policy decision has become 
epiphenomenal to new decision-making. (Livingston and Eachus 
1995:415)  
Also if the government know it can not do anything about the conflict, the 
news images will not be able to change anything. These words seem to be 
confirmed by the war historian Sir Michael Howard. “As in all cases of civil 
conflict, outsiders, however powerful and well- intentioned, can only limit the 
damage and do what they can to blind up the wounds. We cannot solve the 
problems of the world, even if CNN brings them every night into our sitting 
rooms.”(Howard cited in Gowing 1994:86) 
In other words there are some limits on the influence by the media on the 
policy-making process.  
Therefore, the media influences diplomats by shaping the view of the people 
who put pressure on their governments. On the other hand, as Jakobsen 
pointed out, the media can play a very limited role because coverage is 
limited and large numbers of conflicts are ignored. 
The focus of this section was upon assessing the importance of the media 
factor in influencing intervention decisions. It is hard at this stage to find a 
strict answer to a question of whether the media play a significant role in 
influencing political actors. There are many opinions for and against. After 
having a closer look at the case study of Somalia and observing the reaction 
of the United States to the conflict, it will be easier now to analyze in more 
details the case study of Rwanda and then Darfur. We will see if the CNN 
effect does play a big role in influencing the decisions made by the political 
actors. 
3. RWANDA 
 
This section will provide a case study on Rwanda. In order to better 
understand what happened in Rwanda, the first part will concentrate on the 
background of the conflict and the degree of humanitarian intervention will be 
determined. The second part will concentrate on the role of the international 
media in genocide and the last section will present the negative role of the 
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media, mainly “Hate Media” within the country. The essay separates the local 
media from the international media in order to show that in Rwanda there was 
a big distinction between the two. Information that was coming from the local 
media in Rwanda was totally different from the international media. In order 
to better understand the role and impact they both had on the public an 
analysis of international media and Hate Media in Rwanda will be made. Two 
questions will then be answered: 
-Why did the international media not have a strong impact on the international 
community? 
-Why did the local media have such a strong impact on people in Rwanda? 
 
3.1 Background of the conflict 
 
 In order to better understand the role of the media during the genocide the 
background of the conflict should be explained. Rwanda is very small country 
in the Great Lake Region in east central Africa. 
 www.cia.gov 
 
 There are three main ethnic groups in Rwanda: Hutu which is the majority of 
population (85%), Tutsi(12%) ,and Twa(3%) (Roger Bromley 2007:3). Most 
of population is catholic; they all speak the same language and look quite 
24 
 
similar, although Tutsi are described as more “European”. They share their 
history and culture. 
It is very important to mention that Rwanda was a German colony from 1894 
till 1918. Until independence in 1962 it was under the Belgian control. 
Belgians favoured the Tutsi and treaded them as a better, elite race. They 
reinforced the Tutsi domination and introduced identity cards that every 
citizen of Rwanda was required to carry. If the child was from a mixed 
marriage he or she got always attributed to the ethnic group of its father. 
Roger Bromley says: 
There were distinctions between the various ethnic groups, of course, but 
there were mainly based upon differentiated relations to the land and 
production, but the colonial “thesis” racialized ethnic divisions and lent 
credence to the Hutu claims to “indigeneity”, whereas Tutsi were seen, by 
the Hutu, as foreigners and, more negatively, as “invaders”( Bromley 
2007:5).  
As we can see the hate from the Hutu side towards the Tutsi has existed for a 
long time. In Alan Destexhe’s opinion, the conflict between them was not 
only based on the ethnic or racial divisions: 
There were certainly distinguishable social categories in existence before 
the arrival of the colonisers, but the differences between them were not 
based on ethnic or racial divisions. It was by exaggerating such stereotypes 
and supporting one group against the other that the colonisers reinforced, 
consolidated and ultimately exacerbated such categorising. (Destexe 
1995:36). 
 Accordingly the colonizers were fuelling the hate between those two groups.  
3.2 Revolution 
 
In 1957 nine Hutus published Bahutu manifesto, which was the first 
document that expressed opposition to Tutsi domination. Because it was 
written by the Hutu intellectuals, Belgian changed their preferences and 
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started supporting now educated Hutu over the Tutsi who were now described 
as feudal colonist (Destexe 1995:43).  
The Tutsi began being treated as immigrants and the Hutu started to believe 
that they should hold all the power in the country. The Revolution started in 
1959. 20,000 of Tutsi were killed and fled to Uganda. They were mainly the 
educated Tutsi. In 1962, the Republic of Rwanda was established with the 
majority party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) in the 
government.  For the following thirty years Hutu were in power and Tutsi 
existence was undermined. In the 1970’s, under the rule of president 
Kayibanda, the identity cards were used more often. 
After Kayibanda was overthrown by Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973, there 
was a period of calm for several years with no massacres at all between 
1973 and 1990. But despite this apparent period of appeasement, the ethnic 
question remained very much alive. (Destexe 1995:43).  
In the early nineties the Tutsi organised themselves in the neighbouring 
countries and created the Rwanda Patriotic Front in Uganda that demanded 
their rights to be in the Rwandan government.  
It was seen as an attempt of Tutsi to return to power. Its initial effect was 
to aggravate ethnic tension and unite many Hutus around the President. 
Habyarimana then incited a series of pogrom against the Tutsi and 
opposition Hutu people against the threat from the feudal Tutsi. This 
succeeded in reawaking the intense latent mistrust between the two groups 
(Destexe 1995:43) 
  In the end under the international pressure the Hutu power had to share the 
government with RPF. In the meantime the Hutu power was already planning 
how to get rid of the Tutsi. Again in 1992 many Tutsi died. As the tensions 
were growing in October 1993 came to sign the cease-fire in Arusha in 
Tanzania.  So called “Arusha accords” involved power sharing between the 
Hutu and Tutsi. The aim of the accords was to share the power between two 
groups and set up a democracy in Rwanda. Everything would be supervised 
by international forces. Because of the resistance of President Habyarimana 
and extremist Hutu parties the Agreement was not implemented and the 
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conflict continued. On the sixth of April 1994 president of Rwanda Juvenal 
Habyarimana together with Burundi President were shot down in a jet above 
Kigali. The RPF was blamed for the assassination, although there were some 
rumours that Hutu arranged the whole thing in order to have a motive to 
“protect” them from dangerous Tutsi. On the seventh April the massacre 
began. 
3.3 Rwanda and Humanitarian Intervention  
 
The United Nations and the principal countries concerned reacted too late 
and inconsistently to the Rwandan crisis. The international community barely 
realised that it was confronted with a repeat of a singular crime unknown 
since the Second World War. Haunted by the ghost of the recent conflict in 
Somalia, the United States and the Security Council abandoned the Tutsi. 
(Destexe 1995:48) 
When the massacre began the western world was mainly concerned about 
their own nationalities. When ten Belgian soldiers died, they decided to 
withdraw their troops. 
 Despite lot of calls coming from general Romeo Dallaire, who was 
responsible for the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda(UNAMIR) asking for more troops, the United Nations decided to 
withdraw most of them and forbid the use of force. An intervention could 
have saved thousands of human lives. Dallaire continues to insist that with 
an intervention force of 5000 troops, he could have put a halt to the killing. 
(Thompson 2007:4).  
But since events in Somalia, the USA had changed its policy towards the 
intervention and the UN was blocked. President Clinton signed a new 
presidential decision directive (PDD) which basically no to any kind of 
intervention from US side.  The decisions of arguing against the intervention 
were followed by the United Kingdom and France. The lack of coverage only 
helped those actors to follow their decisions with the clean conscious. In the 
case of the United States even the drastic pictures on the TV screens did not 
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make any difference for the decision of withdrawing the troops because they 
had no interest at all in Rwanda. Barnett says: 
The United States claim that it could not have predicted the genocide is 
credible. It had little interest in predicting the future of a country that was 
far outside its strategic interests. Perhaps one day we will learn that the 
United States knew more than it let on, but for the time being, interviews, 
cables, and circumstantial evidence corroborate the claim that  it was no 
smarter than anyone else because it had little interest in becoming so. The 
events of April did not cause Rwanda to leap to the top of the foreign 
policy agenda in Washington because Rwanda did not magically become 
important. For much of this month Rwanda received scant attention at the 
highest levels, and it was not until the refugee crisis in July that 
Washington finally gave Rwanda top billing. (Barnett 2002:161). 
 
Not only the USA but also the UN as an international organization did 
nothing to prevent the genocide.  
In Destexe’s opinion there were two things that the UN could have done, 
neither of which it did:  
It could have made a selective intervention to protect the hospitals, schools 
and other places where the Tutsi were desperately seeking refugee. It could 
have clearly recognised the RPF as a legitimate government of Rwanda 
and so broken off relations with the government that had initiated the 
genocide. Such measures would have changed the course of Rwanda’s 
history. However, the decision in favour of non-involvement was taken: 
not at the UN in New York but in the White House in Washington, haunted 
by the memory of Somalia. (Destexte 1995:51) 
It is worth mentioning that the whole time in Security Council Rwanda had 
their representation from the Hutu side, who were neglecting everything what 
was happening in their country. In this way the permanent members were not 
aware of the fact how the situation really looked like in Rwanda. 
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3.4 International Media Influence 
 
Could the international media have changed what happened in Rwanda? 
Why did the international media not have enough impact on international 
community? These questions will be answered in this chapter. In looking back 
at this period, it is also important to examine the role of the Hate Media which 
was fostering the genocide. The local and the international media could not be 
separated as it will be shown that media can play a positive but also a very 
negative role. Another reason why this essay is analysing the role of 
international and local media is to show that in this case, these two were 
totally different. The international media was playing a role of a “guardian” to 
inform people outside Rwanda what is happening and Hate Media were trying 
to put the western world in a very negative light and in the same time 
fostering genocide. There is plenty of literature about the media in Rwanda, 
especially concentrating on the Rwandan Radio but there is also a growing 
literature on the Rwanda genocide in general and the  role of the media in 
particular. There are different opinions of different authors, academics, 
politicians but also journalists. It will be interesting to observe from different 
perspectives if the media could or could not have changed what happened in 
Rwanda.  
Before we start analyzing how much coverage there was and what impact it 
had it is worth mentioning the reasons why the media were not as active as 
they should have been. First of all Rwanda was a very difficult country to 
access and also very dangerous. Secondly, there were other events happening 
in the world that were priority for the news agencies and for the world. 
Thirdly, the transition of information was difficult because the news 
Headquarters and the public was not interested in what was happening in this 
small country in Africa. The last reason was the level of knowledge of the 
international journalists who came to Rwanda and knew nothing about the 
country led later to lot of misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the 
facts.  All this reasons will be discussed in more detail.  
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In the beginning it is worth mentioning that when the genocide began there 
were no international journalists in Rwanda. Rwandan journalist Thomas 
Kamilindi says: 
The international media weren’t there. On 12 April 1994, all foreigners 
were evacuated. All international public servants, aid workers, journalists- 
they were all evacuated. The genocide began in earnest in those first two 
weeks and nobody knew anything about it. It was done in secrecy at a time 
when what we needed were a few courageous people to come and report 
on this country-this country, which, for many news organizations, didn’t 
seem to exist. (Kamilindi 2007:139) 
Even though Dallaire was calling the UN in New York asking for 
reinforcement, they just ignored his warnings. There seemed to be little 
chance of reinforcements. Instead, the British and the Americans were 
discussing to pull out most of the troops. According to Melvern the issue 
of reinforcement was not discussed in any depth in the press. (Melvern 
2007:202).  
In a criticism of international media Melvern says: 
With no outcry about genocide in the press, no choices were given and no 
risks were taken. At the very least, the genocide should have been 
condemned in the strongest possible terms by the press. (Melvern 
2007:209) 
 
Another reason explaining not sufficient coverage of Rwanda was the fact 
that it was very difficult to get into the country. Nick Robertson a CNN 
reporter says: “Rwanda was very dangerous to get into and nobody really had 
a very accurate picture of what was happening apart from that there were 
hundreds of thousands people being killed and it was not safe to report from 
there.” Another reason for Rwanda not getting enough attention from the 
media, were other events taking place that the world preferred to concentrate 
on. Elections of the first black president in South Africa seemed to appeal to 
audience more than mass killings in Rwanda. Tom Giles a journalist explains 
why the Rwanda genocide was difficult to cover. 
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For nearly three weeks in April, after its (genocide) first days had passed, 
the story of one the twentieth century’s worst crimes had failed- in an age 
of global satellite broadcasting- to make the top of the TV news bulletins. 
This was mainly due to the difficulty of access into Rwanda. But there 
were other issues. Most senior correspondents were down in South Africa 
covering the election of the first black president. In comparison, this story 
seemed at compounded by the appalling nature of these pictures. (Giles 
2007:236).   
In Giles opinion both difficult access to the country and the elections in South 
Africa played an important role. Dying people in Rwanda seemed to be less 
important. 
Rwanda simply wasn’t important enough. To British editors, it was a small 
country far away in a continent that rarely hit the headlines. The words 
Hutu and Tutsi sounded funny, hardly names that ambitious news editor or 
desk officer would want to draw to the attention of a busy boss and claim 
that they were of immediate and vital importance. (Dowden 2007:251). 
 Lot of journalist felt really guilty about not being able to make any 
difference.  Giles is explaining what he as a journalist felt during the 
genocide. 
As journalists, we were rightly quick to condemn the inaction of the UN 
and the wider international community over Rwanda. But many of those 
who tried to cover this appalling story as it happened around them still 
harbour, as I do, a lingering sense of helplessness- a sense of guilt, perhaps 
shame, that we didn’t do more to apply pressure for actions when it might 
have made a difference (Giles 2007:237) 
 
Another reason why the international media did not have such a big impact 
was the war in Bosnia, which was in Europe and had a priority over a country 
in the middle of Africa. In Graphic 1 we can see the comparison between the 
media coverage in Rwanda and in Bosnia from March to July 1994. We can 
see here that in the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 there 
were only 1500 articles in the press in Europe and the USA, while Bosnia 
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coverage got in the same time 3500 articles even though the conflict started 
two years before. We can also see that media coverage of Rwanda was the 
highest in July 1994 (2715 articles) because of the refugee flow to Zaire. This 
research was conducted in Lexis-Nexis database based on the articles from 
English speaking press in Europe and the USA. 
 
Graphic 1 (source Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
At the international level at that time, people were more interested in 
Bosnia than Rwanda. The conflict in Bosnia had started in 1992 and in 
Yugoslavia in 1991. The genocide in Rwanda would have to have lasted 
for two or three years to garner as much media attention as Bosnia. What 
we saw in the media in France was similar to that in North America. There 
was very little coverage of the genocide (Anne Chaon 2007:162)  
For most of April, there were no more than 10-15 reporters in the country at 
any time. Most reporters were ordered to leave because the situation was too 
dangerous. The main reason why the Western correspondents had difficulties 
in reporting ethnic violence was they could not risk their lives in order to 
confirm some allegations. We cannot expect them to risk their lives in order 
to tell the reader what happened. Nick Hughes a journalist and cameraman 
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during the genocide, witnessed some horrible scenes and  describes it in the 
following words: 
At one point, I turned my camera away to look at other activity on the 
road. By the time I panned back to the first spot, two or three men had 
been brought out and killed. You can see that on the footage. You can see 
them still being beaten. What is notable is that they weren’t killed 
instantly; they were slowly beaten to death, tortured. When I focused my 
camera that second time, I could see two women among one pile of bodies. 
There must have been about eight bodies by then and a group of men on 
the other side of the road, investigating something. (Hughes 2007:233) 
 
From these words we can understand what the journalists could feel in that 
moment. It is not easy to watch drastic scenes and knowing that you cannot 
do anything to stop it. 
You have to be extremely courageous and have nerves of steel to go and write 
a report about what you have experienced. It has to be really hard taking 
pictures of people in the agony but maybe there is no other way to do it as 
pictures should shock people. Lindsey Hilsum reporter for Belgian radio 
describes reporting whatever she could manage to see of the horrors unfolding 
in Rwanda in April 1994 “I couldn’t stop the smallest part of it. I am only 
slowly beginning to understand it. At the time I could only watch and 
survive” (Hilsum 2007:185). 
 Tom Giles is saying that 
 after showing massacre scenes during the lunch time someone had issues a 
directive about pictures. This was allowed to set the tone, in the BBC at 
least, or a story of unimaginably greater consequence (Giles 2007:236).  
Ann Chaon is saying that even though they had pictures and stories the editors 
refused to publish their stories because the number of people watching the 
news at the dinner decreased. 
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Reporters were there, pictures were available. Stories were filed. But if 
readers, if people you speak to do not want to listen, you can’t force them. 
They can just turn the dial. (Chaon 2007:165). 
 Not only journalists are to be blamed for the lack of coverage, as we can see 
there was coverage but there was also a problem with transition of the news to 
the TV channels Headquarters and show it in the TV news.  What can 
reporters do if people do not want to watch? In Destexe’s opinion the media 
are not able to change anything if there is no desire from the public and 
government to do anything.  
The Tutsi died out of  sight of the camera and with no help on hand. 
Governments that practise humanitarianism are practising a policy that 
claims nothing can be done in such a situation beyond carrying for the 
survivors. At the political and judiciary levels, the world has no desire to 
act and the cameras are useless. (Destexte 1995:59). 
The editors and producers have the last word. If they decide that there is no 
audience to watch the mass killing they will not put it on air. If the 
audience is falling, then no wonder the directors do not want to show 
humanitarian crisis on TV and replace them with entertainment. EU 
commissioner Bonino has concluded “The sidelining of documentary and 
current affairs programs about humanitarian issues is also due to lack of 
interest among the owners and directors of broadcasting 
companies.”(Bonino quoted in Gowing 1997:21).  
 Dallaire is claiming: 
When news reaches the general population, it shapes public opinion. When 
there is a lack of statesmanship, public opinion can force a government to 
make decisions. Getting information out to the general population and 
holding decision-makers accountable- by continuously berating them about 
what is going on and what they are doing or not doing- is more crucial than 
a few talk shows and a couple of newscasts. In the case of Rwanda, that’s 
where they process broke down.  (Dellaire 2007:15).  
News agencies had enough pictures and material but they just did not want to 
lose their viewers by showing drastic scenes in the bulletins. Another big 
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problem for journalists was to getting their story out of Rwanda. The 
developed world has more technology and capability to cover crisis than ever 
before. Journalist have laptops, mobile phones and internet so they can 
transmit the information whenever they want, so why there was not enough 
coverage in the places like Rwanda? Richard Dowden who was working for 
the Independent during the genocide explains: 
It was also impossible to get the story without leaving Rwanda. 
Telephones did not work and mobile phones did not reach that far in those 
days. To send reports back to the newspapers meant going all the way back 
to Uganda, another day’s journey on roads where you had to drive 
permanently in second gear. (Dowden 2007:250). 
Apparently even though we are living in the era of the high technology it does 
not necessarily have to work everywhere, especially not in the middle of 
Africa. The media were very often accused of reacting too late and also 
misinterpretating the facts by describing the genocide in Rwanda as a tribal 
war. This could be one of the reasons why the western powers like the USA 
or the UK ignored the problem. 
International coverage of Rwanda is most obviously characterized by 
misinterpretation resulting from oversimplification and the related, racist 
tendency to label all conflict in Africa as “tribalism”. (Mcnulty 1999:275). 
Mark Doyle from BBC says: 
 I have to admit that during the first few days, I like others, got the story 
terribly wrong. Down on the ground, up-close- if you could get close 
enough, safely enough- it did look at first like chaos.  I said so. I used the 
word chaos. What I could see clearly in the first few days was the shooting 
war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government, and the 
dead bodies. It was not clear who had killed whom, not at first, and the 
shooting war appeared chaotic whit shifting front lines, a lot of noise and a 
lot of red hot lead flying around (Doyle 2007:145).  
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Mark Doyle managed in the end to correct his first descriptions of “chaos” but 
only because he stayed on the ground, unlike like other journalists who were 
reporting from Nairobi.   
Anna-Marie Huby, who was executive director of Medecins sans Frontieres 
said” In the general public’s memory, the Rwanda crisis was people who die 
of cholera. I think people forgot the long lens coverage of genocide, I 
remember CNN saying: 
“This is genocide again”. We told the reporter that dying of diseases is not 
genocide” (Anna-Marie Huby quoted in Hilsum 2007:169). 
 In her opinion, journalists very often misunderstood what aid agencies were 
telling them. The misinterpretation might have also come out of basic 
knowledge about the region and history of the conflict. It is possible that if the 
media had used the word genocide when the massacre began it might have 
made a huge difference. Unfortunately, none of the reporters dare to use this 
word if it had not been mentioned by any official before. Mark Doyle 
admitted: 
 Looking back through my reports, it appears I didn’t use the word 
“genocide” until 29April, in a report fled from Nairobi that noted that the 
British aid agency Oxfam had described the killing in Rwanda as 
“genocide”(..) after that, as it became clear to me what was happening, I 
used the word genocide more often. But one of the problems we faced in 
reporting the genocide as genocide-apart from, of course confirming the 
facts on the ground- was that it took the rest of the world, including some 
of my editors in London, some time to take it in. (Mark Doyle 2007:154) 
In Graphic 2 we can see how often the word “genocide” was used in context 
with Rwanda.  
As Mark Doyle said before, Oxfam had described Rwanda as genocide there 
was no single article about the “genocide” in Rwanda. And still the number of 
articles is depressing the maximum of articles about Rwanda and genocide 
was used only 25 times in June 1994. It is important to mention that research 
was made on the articles from the press in Europe, United Kingdom and the 
USA. We can clearly see here that the world was avoiding the use of the word 
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“genocide” in order to run from the responsibility. The use of the word 
“genocide” in the press and its influence on the decisions made by the 
political actors will be discussed later in the comparison with Darfur media 
coverage. 
 
Graphic 2 (source Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
 
 Another failure of the media was reacting too late. Livingston says: 
Mark Doyle and Fergal Keane of the BBC, Terry Leonard of the 
Associated Press and Donatella Lorch, then with The New York Times, 
took enormous personal risks in their attempts to cover the massacre, as 
did many others. Yet, despite these efforts, most media attention failed to 
focus on the start of the crisis, when presumably, something could have 
been done to stop the massacre. (Livingston 2007:195).  
There is no doubt that the media arrived too late to cover the genocide but it 
was mostly because of the fear for the journalists lives. After the death of the 
Belgian soldiers at the beginning of genocide, everybody including the 
journalists was withdrawn. 
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In Rwanda, in the first 24 hours of the genocide, the death of ten Belgian 
soldiers was too much for Belgium, the ex- colonial power, to sustain. It 
was a massive schock, I agree, and the Belgians pulled out and tried to 
convince everybody else that we should have leave. They said we would 
all be massacred and nobody wanted to get involved in another African 
escapade where the risk of soldiers lives was too high. (Dallaire 2007:13) 
Mel McNulty is also criticizing international media by ignoring the genocide 
in the beginning of the conflict:  
Generally, images of mass movements of “refugees” in Rwanda suggested 
that these were victims, rarely that many of them were the perpetrators of 
genocide, accompanied by a terrified and intimidated “human shield” of 
real refugees. In contrast, there had been no foreign camera crews in 
Rwanda when the genocide began. (McNulty 1999:270)  
The refugees were presented as victims.  After watching the news the 
audience got the impression that people were feeling from genocide to Zair 
and did not know that most of them were the perpetrators. 
Accordingly, the Guardian front-page banner headline of 23 July 1994, 
“Rwandan apocalypse” did not describe, as might be supposed, the 
genocide which had killed up to a million over the previous three months, 
but the subsequent outbreak of cholera across the Zairean border in the 
camps of Goma. (McNulty 1999:280) 
 
The western media were very interested in the flow of refugees but there 
was no explanation why those people were fleeing. After showing the 
refugee flow on the TV, the USA finally decided to do something. 
President Clinton, finally moved to intervene after the screening of CNN 
film on the camps in Goma. However the United States involvement was 
limited only to humanitarian assistance. (Destexte 1995:71) 
 Unfortunately it was already too late to save any lives. Before that Clinton 
refused to send American troops, despite the media coverage with the horror 
scenes, the soldiers were sent to Zaire not only too late and for just logistical 
purposes. Romeo Dallaire argues that: 
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 Media coverage of Rwanda never gained momentum during the genocide, 
never reached the kind of critical mass needed to move leaders. That 
momentum only emerged in July 1994, when media descended in droves 
to cover the plight of those living in the refugee camps in Goma and 
sparked an international response. (Dallaire 2007:438).  
The interest of the media rose when the refugees started to flow and there was 
less danger for the journalists. Barnett explains: 
Once the media turned its gaze towards Rwanda, it had to stand at a 
distance because the security situation precluded any immediate reporting. 
The result was that the genocide was a private affair, occurring behind 
closed doors. The cameras had to wait until the consequences of the 
genocide came to them. So when the refugees spilled over the border and 
into the camera lens, the media swarmed on the awful spectacle and gave 
sustained coverage to the plight of the refugees. (Barnett 2003:150) 
 
 Again in Rwanda like it was the case in Iraq the media interest raised after 
the refugee flow only it was already too late. Another very important problem 
was that journalist very often did not have enough knowledge about the 
region they went to. Dallaire is accusing journalist of coming to Africa and 
not having enough information to understand what was going on. 
In my view, most of the journalists who came into Rwanda after the war 
started knew little or nothing of the country. Those who did know a lot 
were not necessarily listened to. Many stories were simply gruesome 
accounts of killings. There was little analysis of why we let a potential 
peace process fall into disarray. (Dellaire 2007:15). 
This led to giving wrong information about the refugees and describing them 
all as the victims while many of them were perpetrators. On the other hand, in 
Dallaire’s opinion , even though journalist might not have had enough 
knowledge and they were misinterpreting what was going on, they still 
deserve respect for risking their lives and trying to get out the information in 
the world. Dallaire is defending the work of journalists together with Geoff 
Lone, head of the ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) 
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 The only voice, the only weapon that I had, was the media, I could shame 
the international community into acting, then I would have achieved my 
aim. But despite the courageous work done by reporters in the field, the 
stories often didn’t get past the editors desk. The story never really got told 
and that’s why O.J. Simpson and Tonya Harding got a lot more press than 
800,000 human being slaughtered. (Dallaire 2007:15).  
He is claiming that reporters were very courageous but it still was not enough 
to let the world know what was going on in Rwanda. Furthermore he is 
saying: “ I felt that one good journalist on the ground was worth a  battalion 
of troops, because I realized they could bring pressure to bear” (Dallaire 
2007:16).  
Geoff Lone, head of the ICRC regional delegation in Nairobi, shares Dallaire 
opinion about the importance of the work of international journalists.  He said 
that the media presence took the pressure off his organization, which had 
some food stockpiled in Goma before the exodus.” Because the media was 
there, other humanitarian actors came” (Hilsum 2007:177). The Media can 
have a big impact on the aid agencies and raising the money “CARE had 
never had media coverage like that in the UK before. We raised 1 million 
pounds in three or four weeks” said Alison Camblett (quoted in Hilsum 
2007:182). Even though if it was hard to report, media still played an 
important role in putting pressure on the aid agencies. Andrew Natsios claims 
Media coverage can also serve an important function as a mechanism for 
raising resources (Natsios 1996:149). Another worker Sylvana Foa from 
UNHCR is convinced:”Without TV coverage we are nothing. Our operations 
and their impact would die without TV. (Foa cited in Gowing 1994:37).  
Philippe Gaillard who was responsible for the Red Cross in Rwanda dismisses 
the fact that the media ignored the conflict:” The following day BBC, Reuters, 
Radio France Internationale - it was everywhere(..). Everybody knew every 
day, live, what was happening in Rwanda. You could follow that every day on 
TV, on radio. Who moved? Nobody... They cannot tell us or tell me that they 
did not know. They were told, every day, what was happening there. So don’t 
come back to me and tell me “Sorry,we didn’t know”. No,no,no everybody 
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knew. They knew. It was on TV, in the papers, you cannot tell me they didn’t 
know. (movie: Ghosts of Rwanda  2001) 
The media kept Gailard’s hospital going because people donated money by 
watching terrible pictures on their TV screens. 
If General Dallaire and the others are saying that the media were playing an 
important role it is difficult to argue with that. 
 But it is still important to answer the question could the massacre have been 
prevented if more media attention had been given to events in Rwanda early 
in 1994? In Alan J.Kuperman opinion the media must share the blame for 
failing to provide prompt notice of the genocide. In obscure parts of the 
world, where Western governments do not invest significant intelligence 
assets, the news business is relied on to serve as a surrogate early- warning 
system. In Rwanda, it did not fulfil this role. (Kupermann 2007:258).  
According to Nik Gowing, former diplomatic editor of ITN, Channel Four 
News and now a BBC World presenter, Neither TV journalists nor 
humanitarian organizations should delude themselves about the impact of 
their images on the making of foreign policy (Gowing 1994:15) In a recent 
study he demonstrated from recent examples that television pictures not only 
have a short-term influence in launching humanitarian operations and have 
almost no impact at all on policy-making at the international level.(Gowing 
1994:20). According to his opinion the media could not have changed what 
happened in Rwanda in 1994. Furthermore he is saying: 
Horrifying, intermittent TV images of people being hacked to death and 
piles of bodies and cadavers floating down rivers shocked ministers of 
major Western governments. The kind of “true heart of darkness” 
emotions, referred to by Foreign Secretary Hurd, picked diplomatic 
consciences fleetingly. But they did not lead to any major or fundamental 
policy change, even though senior officials, especially in the U.S. 
government, like to believe that they did. (Gowing 1997:17).  
This essay does not necessarily agree with Gowing opinion and argues that 
the genocide probably could have been prevented if the media had 
concentrated more on the Tutsis dying under the machetes of Hutu instead of 
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giving a false impression of the tribal fights. The use of this cliché dominated 
the early report on the genocide. The Hutu government wanted the media to 
present it as a civil war instead of genocide and they might have succeeded. 
However the reporters did their best to report what was happening in Rwanda 
and this should not be undermined. On the other hand the coverage would 
have been more efficient if the reporters had better knowledge of the conflict 
and its background. 
 Kuperman says: 
 Rwanda's Hutu government wanted reporters to think that violence was 
civil war rather than genocide. In a similarly manipulative way, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army wanted reporters to think that Yugoslav 
government violence prior to NATO's bombing was genocide or ethnic 
cleansing rather than counter-insurgency. In both cases, Western reporters 
were fooled. They should take a lesson from this as they continue their 
vital task of informing Western policymakers and publics about violent 
conflicts around the world. (Kuperman 2007:258). 
 In his opinion Hutu government managed to fool the international journalists 
but they should learn from their mistakes and not repeat them. 
Another issue is the power that a journalist can have over the decisions of 
the political actors. Can journalist force international community or a specific 
country to intervene? Nick Robertson says” I personally would not argue that 
you know report is make a difference on the story 100% but  we don’t make 
all the difference we can tell a story but we will not make people, countries, 
international institutions intervene.” The biggest challenge for a journalist is 
to share with the viewers what he had experienced and saw which will 
mobilize the public to take the responsibility. The public opinion can put than 
a pressure on its country to take some action. This essay agrees with Nick 
Robertson. However, at the same time, it argues that even though the media 
can not force political actors to intervene, they can put a significant pressure 
on society and then the resulting public opinion can put pressure on its 
country to take some action. But it is the moral responsibility of each of us to 
prevent a genocide that happened in Rwanda and not just the media, and not 
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only the five permanent members of the Security Council but also the other 
human rights organizations and people on this planet. 
 
3.5 Hate Media in Rwanda 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter it is essential to also examine 
the role of the local media in Rwanda. Very often the media shape our world 
view and influence our opinion very strongly about a particular topic. This 
was particularly the case for the radio RTLM in Rwanda. What people 
thought and did was very strongly influenced by the local media. This section 
will show that the media can play a very negative role and in the case of 
Rwanda media, it was used as a weapon of genocide. In this chapter the role 
of the “Hate Media” will be discussed. 
In Reychler and Poffenholz definition Hate media can be defined as 
encouraging violent activities, tension, or hatred between races, ethnic or 
social groups, or countries for political goals and/or to foster conflict by 
offering a one-sided or biased view or opinion, and/or resorting to deception. 
(Reychler, Poffenholz 2001:304) 
 RTLM-Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines together with the newspaper 
“Kangura” were playing a very active role in fostering the genocide. RTLM 
began its broadcast in 1993 just after the Arusha Accords were signed and it 
was created by people supporting President Habyarimana.  
RTLM was born when the Arusha Accords were signed between the 
Rwandan government and the RPF. The radio’s shareholders and founders 
were known personalities, bank managers, businessmen, journalists from 
public media, military officers, and government officials. (The Rwanda 
media experience from genocide 2003:16) 
In order to join the radio there was obligatory membership purchase. One 
of the Rwanda journalists Thomas Kamilindi working for the Radio 
Rwanda says that journalists have a major role to play for the good of 
society and should be held to account when, instead, they cause harm. 
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Grave problems were created in my society. Evil took place and journalists 
played an important role. (Kamilindi 2007:136) 
After the shooting down of the plane, journalists at the radio station turned 
their force against the Tutsi and also the Belgian soldiers who were in 
Rwanda. The radio became a genocide tool. Kamilindi says: 
Then, in April 1994 came the genocide. What could the media have done? 
The media are not there to fight, but to set things right, to provide accurate 
information. Instead, there was much propaganda and people received 
messages of hate You simply cannot imagine it (Kamilindi 2007:137). 
 RTLM in contrary to the official Radio Rwanda was trying to reach out to 
ordinary citizens by playing popular music, using informal language and keep 
the radio in form of a talk-show. The anchors were usually very experienced 
journalists who worked before for the government media such as Radio 
Rwanda. They played popular music from Congo and did not use any 
sophisticated language, they also concentrated on a simple chat format not 
mentioning any important information. The target audience was young 
uneducated Hutu who were ready to fight and to kill.  The minister of 
information was concerned about the content of the radio but nobody went so 
far to ask to close down the station. 
After 6 April 1994, RTLM called on all Hutu to “rise up as a single man” 
to defend their country in what was said to be the “final” war. One 
announcer predicted that the “war would exterminate the Tutsi from the 
globe...make them disappear once and for all.” RTML staff carried forward 
all the ruthlessness of the Tutsi. (Allison de Forges 2007:48) 
There was a reason why the radio was so powerful.  There was relatively high 
level of illiteracy; people could not really afford to buy newspapers so radio 
was the cheapest and easiest way to get to information. Even if you could not 
afford the radio there was always somebody in the neighbourhood that had 
one, people gathered and listened to it together. RTLM  means “one thousand 
hills free radio and”was a private station founded by fifty high level 
government officials from Hutu Power together with businessman and 
journalists from the official media. It began to broadcast in July 1993, almost 
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one year before the genocide. RTLM received very little international 
attention until the genocide when it became very clear that the radio was an 
incitement to genocide. Romeo Dellaire described the radio RTLM in 
following words: 
The local media, particularly the extremist radio station Radio-Television 
Libre de Milles Collins( RTLM), were literally part of the genocide. The 
genocidaires used the media like a weapon. The haunting image of killers 
with a machete in one hand and a radio in the other never leaves you. 
(Dallaire 2007:12) 
 Reporters were calling to violence using formulations such as “the grave is 
only half full, who will help us to fill it?” (Broadcasting genocide 1996:84) 
The radio station was used to track down people and then to kill them. 
Journalists were giving names and addresses of Tutsi. They did not even 
hesitate to threat to the United Nations General Dallaire. 
Later in May, RTLM said that General Dallaire should be killed, identifying 
him as a white man with moustache. (Allison de Forges 2007:49) 
Journalists were going on the streets, doing interviews and asking Hutu 
people why they are killing Tutsi. They wanted to encourage other people to 
do the same. Clearly the language they were using was used to incite 
genocide. They were comparing Tutsi to cockroaches that could be killed with 
any tools: 
Fight them with the weapons at your disposal; you have arrows, you have 
spears…. Take up your traditional “tools.” (Broadcasting genocide 1996:117) 
Using other phrases, they were calling to exterminate them because they are a 
different race.  
They should all stand up and so that we will kill the Inkotanyi and 
exterminate them… the reason why we will exterminate them is that they 
belong to one ethnic group. Look at one person, at his height and physical 
features, look closely at his cute little nose and then break it (Allan 
Thompson 2007:282) 
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Reporters from the radio were also sent when there was a UN convoy taking 
some white people to safety, among them there were also some Tutsi trying to 
hide. When a journalist witnessed that a message was immediately sent to the 
radio and within minutes of the air there was an announcement to stop the 
convoy.  Another issue that is connected with the role of RTLM was its 
attitude towards the United Nations and especially the UN soldiers. Not only 
it did not transmit any information about what the UN was doing in Rwanda 
but it was very hostile towards it. Dallaire says: 
It became clear to me that none of the radio stations in Rwanda actually 
told people why we were there. No information from us was being passed 
on. People saw a while vehicle with a blue flag going by at 70 kilometres 
an hour, but many Rwandans had no idea why we were there. Those who 
did know were led to believe that we could do much more than our 
mandate actually permitted. (Dallaire 2007:17). 
The question could now be set to that of why the international community did 
nothing to stop the radio from inciting genocide?  
Having seen the power of hate radio in Rwanda, international actors started to 
think about jamming the radio. Only the USA had the resources to do it but 
after long talks they used excuses such as a freedom of speech, and costs of 
the operation and they gave up the idea. 
 Even though the Human Right Watch argued that jamming radio 
broadcast would disrupt incitements to genocidal violence and would limit 
the delivery of genocidal directives. And, argued the human rights group, 
jamming the broadcast would deliver a broader message as well: it would 
make clear international condemnation of the genocide, thus weakening the 
claim of the authorities to legitimacy and perhaps encouraging resistance 
against the killing. (Allison de Forges 2007:51)  
The USA still refused to do anything. The fact that Rwanda was a non-
permanent member in the Security Council only reinforced the statement that 
RTLM was not a weapon of genocide but only a form of expression of 
thoughts. 
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On 1 June, Ted Kennedy, an influential senator, made a new effort to get 
action and asked the US Secretary of State to cooperate with the UN in 
ending “the unconscionable incitement to genocide” being carried out by 
radio stations in Rwanda. Once again the official response described 
jamming as “legally contentious”, an assertion to which officials again 
added arguments concerning the cost and supposed ineffectiveness of 
jamming the radio. (Allison de Forges: 2007:51) 
The French also had the opportunity to jam the radio but they did not use it 
claiming it was not their duty and sent the equipment back to France. There 
was nothing that international community could do, although General Dallaire 
was suggesting many times to stop work of the radio but with no results. 
In the last months before the genocide started, RTLM emphasized the 
similarity between what was happening in 1994 and what had happened in 
1959. It was a choice of going back to the slavery that proceeded 1959 or 
rising up and protecting ones freedom, even one’s life. For that, one could 
not trust any Tutsi civilian because it was not possible to know how deeply 
the RPF had infiltrated such people (Mary Kimani 2007:113). 
We can observe here that the aim of the radio was to show the connection 
with the history and eliminate all Tutsi as they do not belong to the nation. 
Journalists were mainly concentrating on the Rwandan Patriotic Front and 
that they could not be trusted.  
Unfortunately the radio was not the only tool used for genocide; there were 
also other media which were calling to violence such as Newspaper 
“Kangura”. 
A special case was Kangura’s chief-editor, Hassan Ngeze whose education 
was said to be modest, at primary-school level. He still worked as a bus-
controller while he was free-lancer for the new independent newspaper 
Kanguka. (The Rwanda media experience from genocide 2003:16) 
 It was easier to control uneducated people.“Kangura” public was not as broad 
as in case of the RTLM as people could not afford it but it was still a very 
powerful tool of genocide. In its 10 Commandments they called upon the 
Hutu to exterminate Tutsi before they do it first. The 10 Commandments 
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which mimic the 10 Commandments from the Bible were well known among 
the Christian society. They were published in December 1990 four years 
before the genocide. These commandments were instructions on how to 
exterminate the Tutsi. They were trying to get rid of them from the country, 
including all the public institutions such as hospitals and schools. The Hutu 
men and women were called to kill their spouses if they were Tutsi. These 
commandments were also broadcasted on the radio. As mentioned before 
more people were listening to the radio but very often educated doctors and 
teachers who read the newspapers and shaped their ideology, becoming 
murders. 
As we can see media was a very powerful weapon in the time of genocide in 
Rwanda, especially the Radio. In 2003 in the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), the directors of genocide were accused of being co-
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. The radio station was claimed to 
have fanned the flames of hate and genocide in Rwanda. The Rwanda 
journalist Thomas Kamilinidi, who was working for Radio Rwanda before the 
genocide started, testified: 
I testified because I consider journalists to be citizens like any other 
members of the society. They should be held accountable for their actions 
and if need to be prosecuted. I also testified because of my belief that 
journalists have a major role to play for the good of society and should be 
held to account when, instead they cause harm. Grave problems were 
created in my society. Evil took place and journalists played an important 
role. (Kamilindi 2007:136). 
If even a local journalist was testifying against their colleges, it had to mean 
that the journalists were really playing a crucial role in the genocide and 
should have been prosecuted. The owners of the radio were accused of 
committing the genocide together with other journalists. They claimed that 
they were trying to defend themselves saying they were not committing 
genocide itself, because they were only telling how the things were. This does 
not change the fact that they incited genocide. Without their propaganda it is 
sure that so many people would not have been killed. The interim government 
minister of Information, Eliezer Niyiegeka claimed that RTLM respected the 
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right of reply and that anybody could call and correct what had been said 
about them. In December 1994, he said: 
RTLM was an independent station. Anyway, nobody complained about 
RTLM except of the UN commander, General Dallaire, who did not like 
what was said about him. I asked RTLM offer him airtime for his views 
and they did. If others had complained, they could have had time to put 
their view. (Broadcasting genocide 1996:144). 
It could be argued that there was a freedom of speech and it was a private 
radio but seeing the above quoted sentences it should have been enough for 
the USA to jam the radio. In the end, it must be concluded that radio RTLM 
was a tool of genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It was not only inciting the 
genocide but was very directly calling people to kill by giving names and 
addresses. All the arguments shown above support this statement. 800,000 
people were killed in the period of three months. This was the biggest 
genocide since the World War II where six million people were killed in 
seven years. It was clearly planned action with the aim of exterminating all 
Tutsi. Among these 800,000 people were also Hutu who were opposing to 
commit crimes against the Tutsi or were trying to protect them. They were 
also traced down by the radio. The international community failed to jam the 
radio, as they claimed it would not have changed anything but it is quite clear 
that it probably would have made a big difference. The people who were 
doing the killing claimed that they did only what they were told to do. They 
claimed that they just wanted to protect themselves from an evil ethnic group. 
Using words on the air such as cockroaches, dogs and snakes had very strong 
effect. There is a big possibility, that even though there is a freedom of speech 
in any western society if such words were used against any person it would be 
jammed immediately. Is it enough that the journalists and owner of the radio 
have been prosecuted? Maybe it is but it will never return the lost lives. 
 It could be also argued that without RTLM, the genocide would have taken 
place anyway as it was a planned action. However the process of killing 
would probably have taken much longer than three months. Hate media was 
also used during the World War II. “Der Sturmer” was an anti-Semitic 
newspaper, which was not as powerful as RTLM but also had contributed to 
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the genocide of Jews. There are also more examples of hate media in other 
countries like Ivory Coast or Zimbabwe. If the Hate media occur it should be 
jammed in every country immediately.  There also a lot of countries where the 
authorities are putting limits on the freedom of expression especially in 
Africa. 
In African media, journalists often have to pay a high price for following their 
own conscience. As one Kenyan journalist put it: “As much as you want to 
keep your freedom, there is a limit beyond which you cannot go”. This limit is 
defined by the pressure and harassment faced by journalists who report truths 
that those in power do not want to hear. (Reychler, Poffenholz 2001:313) 
 The journalists are very often not good trained and that is why they are 
easy to manipulate. In Rwanda there was no school of journalism before 
1996. The School of Journalism and Communication was founded in 1996 
at the National University of Rwanda. The curriculum was very theoretical 
with much thinking about the role of the media. (Rwanda Media 
Experience 2003:23) 
 The journalists were very often people with basic education who were 
learning by doing. In the report about Rwanda Media experience ingredients 
which made “Hate Media” a success in Rwanda are discussed: 
-strong ideology behind 
-control over strong mass media 
-psychological preparation to hate 
-violence invades everything (The Rwanda media experience from genocide 
2003:20) 
All these factors made it possible for the “Hate Media” to develop and incite 
genocide. After what happened in Rwanda it should be learnt that something 
like that should never happen again. The journalists in Africa should be better 
trained, there should be sanctions if there are any signs of occurring of “Hate 
media”. In the moment there are international correspondents in Rwanda but 
they are still controlled by the local authorities. 
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Authorities are informed on journalists’ movements. One has to call them 
before broadcasting to inform on the subject and give them a chance to 
make their point. When authorities are displeased, they give a warning. 
After three warnings, a foreign correspondent has to leave the country. 
(The Rwanda media experience from genocide 2003:23)  
Currently in Rwanda there are no sign of “Hate Media” anymore but the 
public media are still controlled by the government and the private ones 
cannot say critical things about the authorities. Work of journalist is 
considered to be dangerous and not well paid so there are not many students 
who want to study journalism. Most journalists who are teaching at university 
are coming anyway from other countries because Rwanda lacks of 
professional journalists. Unfortunately there are still many other countries in 
the world where government is controlling the media and tell the journalists 
what they should write. Luckily stations like CNN are trying to deal with 
these problems and are organizing special competition for African journalists 
hoping that this will bring some changes such as “CNN Multichoice African 
Journalists Awards” 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that international media and as well the local media in 
Rwanda had a big influence on the genocide. To answer question asked at the 
beginning of this chapter could have the international media changed what 
had happened in Rwanda? To some extent probably the answer is yes if the 
international media showed up on time and were giving correct information to 
the public and not interpreting genocide as a “’tribe war”, this probably would 
have made a big difference but the blame should not be shifted only on the 
reporters. The fact is that the media occurred in Rwanda after the genocide 
when the flow of refugees appeared but it was already too late for saving any 
lives.  Shiras compared the media influence on the political actors with 
Somalia case. 
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The media played a key role in drawing attention to Somalia, once it was a 
major humanitarian crisis, but media coverage of Somalia was limited 
before then. In contrast, media coverage of Rwanda during the period of 
genocide was extensive but provoked not large-scale international response 
until refugee flows began. Galvanizing early action remains one of the 
central challenges to the international community. The lack of political will 
to act early enough in response to conflicts and the inadequacy of 
preventive diplomacy and peace-building have been central failures (Shiras 
1996:99)  
 
Maybe if the media influence had arrived earlier may it would have pushed 
the countries to intervene instead of withdrawing troops and leave people to 
die. 
 This chapter has proven that journalists did their best to report the genocide 
and risk their lives. Unfortunately the news organizations did not feel the need 
to show the drastic pictures on TV enough to move political actors to take 
some action. There are pro and con arguments on whether the genocide could 
have been prevented if the media had reacted faster. This essay argues that 
even though there is lot of evidence that the genocide could have been 
prevented it should not be forgotten that as Nick Robertson said “the media 
cannot force political actors to intervene” they can only push them in this 
direction by influencing public opinion. There is a lot of evidence that the 
media also played a positive role by helping to raise money and supporting 
aid agencies. 
Media coverage of general humanitarian issues is essential to persuade 
regular supporters to give money to their chosen NGO. Specific attention 
raises the profile of an organization and will attract new supporters. 
(Hilsum 2007:176)  
Yet for all the humanitarian operations, television coverage remained their 
most vital ally. It can be concluded that media played a vital role in Rwanda. 
Some things should be improved in the future but in order to answer the 
question if the media learnt from their mistakes the second chapter devoted to 
conflict in Darfur should find an answer. 
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 Hate Media definitely played a very significant role in fostering the 
genocide in Rwanda. Radio RTLM and newspaper Kangura were calling 
people to kill their neighbours. There is no excuse for journalists who were 
working for those organizations. The blame for genocide lies on both sides 
the international media should have focused more on the conflict at the 
beginning and interpreting the facts correctly and international actors should 
have take action to jam the radio which was fostering the genocide. 
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4. DARFUR 
 
This section will provide a case study on Darfur. Similar to the chapter on 
Rwanda this section will concentrate on the role of the media in the conflict. 
In order to better understand what happened in Darfur, the background of the 
conflict will be discussed in the first section. The chronology of the events is 
significant for the media influence. The second part will concentrate on the 
role of the international media in genocide. In the end two questions will be 
answered: 
- What role did the media play in Darfur? 
- Why did the international interest in the conflict appear so late? 
4.1 Background of the Conflict  
Darfur is a region in Sudan, approximately the size of France. It is divided 
into those federal states: West Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur.  
Dar Fur (meaning “homeland of the Fur”) was founded as an independent 
sultanate in 1630 and incorporated into the British colony of Sudan in 1917. 
(Grzyb 2009:7) 
 World press map. 
There are many causes of the conflict. First of all it is rooted in the structural 
inequality of the country. There are lot of differences between the centre of 
Sudan and peripheries of such a region like Darfur, which is located in 
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western part of Sudan. Tensions were growing in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century by a combination of environmental problems, non-
sustainable fast population growth, political opportunism and regional 
politics. The high point of the conflict  began in 2003 after a rebel group 
began attacking government targets, saying the region was being neglected by 
Khartoum. The rebels say the government is oppressing black Africans in 
favour of Arabs. 
The rebels claimed that Sudanese President Omar-al Bashir had neglected 
to invest in the physical and economic infrastructure of Darfur, and that the 
Government of Sudan favoured the interest of regional Arabs over non-
Arab people. (Grzyb 2009:7) 
Darfur has faced many years of tension over land and grazing rights between 
the mostly nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa 
communities. There are two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), although both groups 
have split, some along ethnic lines. More than a dozen rebel groups are now 
believed to exist. The ethnic tensions and problems did exist in Dafur for a 
long time. The ethnic tensions in Darfur were and still are real but are not the 
main problems of the conflict.  Prunier describes it in the following words: 
When Darfur villages were bombed by Antonow aircraft and strafed by 
combat helicopters, this was not the work of spontaneously violent local 
nomads. When the Janjaweed were organized into coordinated military 
units and assigned to camps they shared with the regular army, it was not 
possible to characterize what was happening as “spontaneous violence” 
(Prunier2005:153) 
The other side of the conflict is between the Sudanese military and 
Janjaweed, a militia group, who are opposed to any religions other than 
Islam. The important thing in the whole conflict is the role of Government of 
Sudan which denies the whole time its involvement in the massacre and 
supporting the Janjaweed group. The government is saying that the problems 
of Darfur were caused by “bandits not rebels”. In their opinion, there was no 
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rebellion in Darfur, just a conflict among specific tribes. The government 
thinks that western countries are creating propaganda and also denies the 
number of people killed in the whole conflict. There is proof that the JEM has 
been controlled by Hassan al-Turabi, who is a political leader of Sudan and 
was a leader of National Islamic Front. The government-supported Janjaweed 
were accused of committing major human rights violations, including mass 
killing and raping of the non-Arab population of Darfur. 
 The International Criminal Court issued warrants for the arrest of Ahmed 
Harun for war crimes against humanity. However, the government of 
Sudan has made no attempt to arrest him and hand him over to the ICC. 
Ahmed Harum is currently Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of 
the Government of Sudan. He controls international relief efforts and all 
camps for the internally displaced people of Darfur. ( movie:Darfur now) 
 Janjaweed forces have frequently burned down whole villages, driving the 
surviving inhabitants to flee to refugee camps, mainly in Darfur and Chad. 
Many of the camps in Darfur are surrounded by Janjaweed forces. 
Accordingly to the UN peacekeeping homepage: 
More than 200,000 people are estimated to have died and at least 2 million 
displaced from their homes in Darfur since fighting broke out in 2003 
between Government of Sudan forces, allied Janjaweed militia and other 
armed rebel groups. Atrocities such as the murder of civilians and the rape 
of women and girls have been widespread and continue, underscoring the 
necessity for urgent action. 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html) 
The UN accused Sudan government of taking part in violations in Darfur and 
called for urgent action to protect the civilians there. The conflict is usually 
described as between “Arabs” and “non-Arabs”. De Waal is describing Darfur 
as one of the most forgotten and neglected humanitarian crises in the world. 
He urged the international community to provide urgent humanitarian 
assistance to civilians and to support peace negotiations between the GOS and 
the Darfur rebel groups (De Waal 2007:9).  It is true that the conflict has been 
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neglected by the international community for a long time. Since 2003 
Janjaweed has been committing crimes and the world just stood by. Only 
after a year when Darfur was described by UN Human Rights Coordinator for 
Sudan, Mukesh Kapila as the “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis” it 
became big news and the international community looked towards Darfur. 
As the Dafur story took hold in the media in the spring and summer of 
2004, the two key preoccupations of the international community- what to 
call the violence in Darfur and now how to intervene and stop it- continued 
to resonate as several interconnected, overlapping questions. (Grzyb 
2009:10).  
The UN Security Council passed many resolutions between 2004 and 2008. 
Unfortunately, not all of them were fully implemented in the end. The are also 
problems with deployment of troops which has been delayed by the Sudanese 
government. This is not the only problem, the unwillingness of the countries 
to contribute troops and the UN bureaucracy plays also a big role. Leaders of 
the countries are lead by their economic interest instead of caring about 
human rights. Very often scholars and media compare Darfur to Rwanda as 
the international community abandoned Darfurian civilians as they did with 
the Tutsi. 10 years after what had happened in Rwanda we have genocide 
again. What Primo Levi had said of the Holocaust was now being said about 
Rwanda: “It happened, so it will happen again.”(Levi quouted in Caplan 
2009:36). After less than a decade it came to be time for Darfur to be 
described by many as “next Rwanda”. The question that comes to our mind is 
why it has to take so much time to react for the tragedy that happened there? 
What role did the media play in the conflict and why did the interest in the 
conflict appear so late? Did the world learn nothing from the lessons in 
Rwanda? 
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4.2 International Media 
 
For the western world Rwanda and Darfur are and were remained as an 
“African crisis”. Prunier says: 
Once the international media got hold of it, it became a “humanitarian 
crisis”- in other words, something that many realist politicians saw 
(without saying so) as just another insoluble problem.(Prunier 2005:124). 
 After tragedy in Rwanda, we might think that the media learnt something 
from their mistakes, but after having considered Darfur it is clear that not a lot 
has changed. Allan Thomson sets a question: 
More than a decade later are we any wiser? What has changed and what have 
we learned from what went wrong? In  part, the answer lies in Darfur, the 
region in Western Sudan widely acknowledged in early 2006 to be a 
humanitarian and human rights tragedy of the first order (Thomson 
2007:434).  
 The two questions were set in the beginning: what role did the media play in 
Darfur and why did the interest in the conflict appear so late? Those will be 
answered in this section. 
The first part of this chapter will analyze all the problems that journalism was 
facing in Darfur and the second part will concentrate on the positive side of 
reporting in the region of Sudan. 
 The conflict began in February 2003 and it was totally missed by the 
international media. The only source of information was specialist 
publications such as Africa Confidential, Amnesty International and 
International Crisis group were the first NGOS that began to report on Darfur. 
In Prunier’s opinion the French media were the first who noticed the conflict: 
 Given their interest in Chad, the French media were among the first to 
give a separate picture of the Darfur situation. Then, the first US article on 
the subject focused immediately on the “Black versus Arab” side of the 
problem, an aspect which, even if justified, was going to obscure rather 
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than clarify the essential elements in the following months because of its 
misleadingly “evident” explanatory power. (Prunier 2005:127).  
After failure of the media in Rwanda exactly the same thing happened in 
Darfur. Nicholas Christof New York Times journalist criticizes the media: 
We had done a lazy job covering genocide. During the Second World War 
New York Times published 24.000 front page stories during the Holocaust 
and of these 6 on front page described attacks on Jews. We have this long 
tradition of ignoring genocide as it happens and years later we say how we 
could not have given more coverage. (movie: Sand and Sorrow)  
From the journalists words we can understand that the media are always 
ignoring the genocide in the beginning and after they contemplate about their 
failure. After Holocaust and Rwanda it is high time for make up for mistakes. 
In case of Darfur the media were silent for the first year. 
The real peak in the media came when the UN Human Rights Coordinator for 
Sudan, Mukesh Kapila declared that Darfur was “the world’s greatest 
humanitarian crisis” and that “the only difference between Rwanda and 
Darfur is now the numbers involved” (Kapila quoted in Prunier 2005:127).  
This statement, made on the evening of the 10th anniversary of the start of the 
genocide in Rwanda, is widely recognised to have had a major impact on 
getting the world’s attention towards Darfur. (Petersen, Tallin 2005:17) 
Kapila statement contributed a lot to the raising of the alarm about what is 
happening in Darfur. It was significant moment when newspaper started to 
write about genocide. Once they started to write, unfortunately they got it 
wrong and described the conflict as fights between the Arabs and the Blacks. 
Journalists were not concerned about the fact that Arabs were often black. 
Darfur was the top news in 2004 until the Tsunami in Asia in December that 
wiped Darfur from the screens. Prunier suggests that Darfur was replaced by 
Tsunami as a humanitarian story:  
Darfur instantly vanished from the TV screens and the pages of 
newspapers. The media could only handle one emotion-laden story at a 
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time, not two, and the tsunami was much more politically correct than 
Darfur; it was unpolitical only emotional. (Prunier 2005:115). 
 Another important moment for the media was when the Under-Secretary-
General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egleland, called Darfur the world’s 
worst humanitarian disaster. From that point on, the crisis attracted 
significantly increased attention. (HPG Policy Brief 28, 2007:2).  
This statement and words said by Kapila were the two most important 
moments where the world attention was lead to Darfur. In Prunier’s opinion 
also the negotiations between the Government and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA) were taking place in Kenya also had a big influence 
on the start point of media coverage. 
Darfur’s war gained international attention just as the negotiations to 
conclude the long-running hostilities between the central government and 
the SPLA were approaching conclusion in the Kenyan town of Naivasha. 
(De Waal 2007:2) 
On 9 September 2004, the word “genocide” was used in relation to Darfur by 
the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, when he declared “that 
genocide has occurred in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the 
Janjaweed bear responsibility, and that genocide may still be continuing”. 
(Powell quoted in Melvern 2006:101). Colin Powell mentioned for the first 
time word “genocide” but in the same time added that the USA is not obliged 
to take any military action. Using word “genocide” did not push the USA to 
do anything. Powell further stated: 
Mr Chairman, some seen to be waiting for this determination of genocide to 
take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination”. 
(Powell quoted in Markusen 2009:99). Despite the statement and peak of the 
media it did not influence the political action of the USA towards Darfur.  
There are two very important statements that influenced the media coverage 
first Kapila’s statement comparing Darfur to Rwanda on the 10th anniversary 
of genocide  on the 22 march 2004 Darfur  is called worst humanitarian 
disaster and later Colin Powell describes Darfur as a genocide on the 9 
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September 2004. We can see that in Graphic 3 where the media coverage of 
Darfur from 2003 until 2006 is shown. The big peak of the media coverage 
was between those two statements. 
Graphic 3. Darfur Media Coverage (source Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
A search for word Darfur was conducted for all english newspapers and 
journals from Europe and United States on the Lexis-Nexis database to obtain 
the profile how did the statemets of Kapila and Colin Powell influenced the 
media coverage. It is very to clear to observe that there was no media 
coverage in 2003, only after March 2004 when Kapila called Darfur the worst 
humanitarian disaster the peak started. We can observe quite high coverage 
level in 2004. As we can see the graphic does not agree with the words of 
Prunier who said that Darfur was wipped by Tsunami disaster. There is a 
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small dropp in November 2004 but after that Darfur comes back on the news 
radar. Again in April 2006 Darfur gets more media attention because of 
George Clooney speech and visit to Darfur. Here it can be observed big help 
from celebrities side. Peace agreement was signed in May 2006 so this also 
provoked more media attention. Nevertheless it needs to be said that media 
coverage was not consistent from the beginning of the conflict.  
The killing in Darfur peaked at certain points in 2004 and 2006 and 
virtually dropped off the media radar at other points. The coverage has 
been decidedly inconsistent, with clusters of Darfur stories often followed 
by weeks of silence. (Grzyb 2009:79). 
Tom Vesey who is head of media analysts Carma International, made a study 
about media coverage of different natural disasters like Tsunami in Asia, 
Katrina in New Orleans and Stan in central America and of course Darfur. 
From Carma studies it turned out that Katarina got the most coverage. Report 
argues that: 
 Western media response to these and other humanitarian disasters is 
driven by selfishness and egocentricity. Domestic politics, tourism and 
feelgood tales about western heroism and donations make a story, rather 
than human suffering. (Carma 2006:8). 
 Furthermore the report also explains why Darfur did not get so much 
coverage as the natural disaster like Tsunami or Katrina: 
Politics also played a key role in news desk decisions. For the first 
18months of the Darfur disaster, only 73 articles were written globally, as 
the disaster had not developed political capital”. Most newspapers 
preferred to use coverage of Katrina as an opportunity to savage the Bush 
administration for the inadequate aid effort. (Carma 2006:12).  
It looks like not only the media can have influence on the politics but also 
politics play a role in news desk decisions as report claims. 
 It can be argued that because the media in Darfur was waiting over a year 
after the fighting began, many people died. The fighting in Darfur is ongoing 
despite the peace agreements signed in 2006 in Abuja Nigeria. Hundreds of 
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thousands of people have been killed and displaced and nobody did anything 
about it. It is now important to answer the question of why the media reacted 
so late and what difficulties did it face. 
 In Prunier’s opinion Darfur, was not expected to happen when it did, and it 
did not fit the common patterns of thinking about Sudan. Everyone knew that 
this was a religious was where wicked Muslims killed desperately struggling 
Christians. (Prunier 2005:129). Whole world expected peace and the media 
was waiting for a nice story peace and returning refugees. 
4.3 Journalists Obstacles For Covering Darfur 
 
 As mentioned before Darfur in 2003 was totally ignored by the news 
mainstream. However it needs to be explained why the media ignored the 
conflict in its origin. As was the case in Rwanda, the journalists in Darfur did 
not have an easy task. There were lot of obstacles to get the information out of 
the country. The first reason why the media reacted so late and why the 
coverage was not constant was the position of President Omar el-Bashir who 
did everything what he could to make it impossible for journalists to get into 
Darfur. The travel permits for NGO workers and journalists were valid only 
for three days. It was just impossible to get into the country. The Government 
of Sudan was trying to prevent information from leaving the country in order 
to avoid any military action from the international community. They knew 
they could not do it forever but they were just training to gain on time. Bacon 
explains what a large role does the Government of Sudan play in restricting 
the work of international media: 
Modern tyrants understand how to control the media, and Omar al Bashir, 
the president of Sudan, is a master. His government's efforts to prevent 
widespread coverage of the death and destruction in its Darfur region 
succeeded for months. The crisis began in early 2003, but didn't make 
front-page headlines or the nightly news until this May. As a result, the 
systematic killing didn't spark enough public outrage to generate a quick 
international response. In fact, by the time major U.S. news coverage 
began, as many as 30,000 people had died and more than a million had 
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been displaced by a government backed militia called the Janjaweed. 
(Bacon 2004:1).  
As we can see the work of journalist was hampered by the Government of 
Sudan, in the same moment it was even dangerous for the reporter’s life. 
Bacon further notes: 
Bashir understands that people respond to tragedies they see unfolding on 
TV. So when the first international television coverage of the Darfur crisis 
aired - on Al Jazeera last December - his government closed the network's 
Khartoum bureau, confiscated its equipment, and arrested the reporter. 
(Bacon 2004:1).  
The position of the Government of Sudan is very important as a hindrance for 
journalists to report. Nick Robertso says: “there are many obstacles that you 
face, for instance in Darfur is getting permission from government to get 
there. I mean Darfur is horrendously underreported it should be on TV much 
more but you know you have to get the permission to get there and the 
government doesn’t want to see it so its hard to get to Darfur.”  The CNN 
reporter admits there is not enough coverage of Darfur but there are no easy 
options for a journalist if the country denies your entry and you have to wait 
for your visa for months. There were many other obstacles for journalists in 
Darfur. Thomson points out the followings: 
Once again journalists cite the number of factors that made it difficult to 
cover Darfur: it is hard to get into the region, tight budget, the news focus 
on the war in Iraq and the presumed lack of audience interest in Africa 
(Thomson 2007:436).  
Guardian journalist Ewen MacAskill reports how hard it is to get to Darfur:  
Journalists are getting into Darfur, but the Sudanese government is 
restricting access, leaving many waiting in Khartoum for weeks seeking 
permission to visit. A BBC crew including its correspondent Hilary 
Anderson, along with David White of the Financial Times and myself, 
hitched a lift on a United Nations flight with the international development 
secretary, Hillary Benn, from Khartoum to Nyala. (MacAskill 2004:2). 
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 Nick Robertson explains how hard he found it to cover Darfur and Iraq at the 
same time and hard it was to get a visa: 
“When Darfur was breaking up the war in Iraq was beginning and becoming, 
getting close to happening and there was lot coverage and I was CNN person 
in Bagdad so I was hardly gonnna be a guy and you don’t get visas, you don’t 
get a visa for Iraq  you don’t jump out of Iraq to go to Rwanda you can’t get 
visa in Darfur, you don’t get a visa to come back to Iraq and I was there for 4 
months because of the visa problems again.”  As discussed before in the CNN 
effect countries have their priorities and Darfur appeared to be one of them. 
Ewen MacAskill is wondering why the Israel- Palestinian conflict receives far 
more attention from the media than Darfur or Congo: 
In Africa, there are many unrecorded or poorly recorded, conflicts. The 
death toll in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
estimated at between two and four million, but has had relatively little 
media coverage compared with the almost daily reporting of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, with a death toll of more than 3,000 over the past four 
years. (MacAskill 2004:2) 
Another issue raised by Thomson is the lack of audience interest in Africa and 
greater concentration on entertainment. 
 More recently a quantitative monitoring of all news segments aired in 
June 2005 on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News and MSNBC 
demonstrated that coverage of Darfur was overshadowed by reporting on 
the so-called “runaway bride”, The Michael Jackson trial and Tom 
Cruise’s new movie and relationship with actress Katie Holmes. (Thomson 
2007:437).  
This only shows how much the news organization care about dying people 
and how much to they care about entertainment. Journalist Nicholas Kristof a 
New York Times journalist is criticizing his colleges for not giving enough 
attention to Darfur: 
Serious newspapers have done the best job of covering Darfur, and I take 
my hat off to Emily Wax of The Washington Post and to several 
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colleagues at The Times for their reporting. Time magazine gets credit for 
putting Darfur on its cover - but the newsweeklies should be embarrassed 
that better magazine coverage of Darfur has often been in Christianity 
Today. (Kristof 2005:2). 
 Furthermore he is attacking television channels: 
The real failure has been the television networks. According to monitoring by 
the Tyndall Report, ABC News had a total of 18 minutes of the Darfur 
genocide in its nightly newscasts all last year - and that turns out to be a credit 
to Peter Jennings. NBC had only 5 minutes of coverage all last year, and CBS 
only 3 minutes - about a minute of coverage for every 100,000 deaths. In 
contrast, Martha Stewart received 130 minutes of coverage by the three 
networks. 
Incredibly, more than two years into the genocide, NBC, aside from covering 
official trips, has still not bothered to send one of its own correspondents into 
Darfur for independent reporting. (Kristof 2005:2). 
In his opinion the media failed in Darfur and the coverage was more 
concentrated on entertainment than on dying people. 
Another big obstacle for journalists in Darfur was the danger. Nick Robertson 
describes one of the most dangerous situations he has been in during his 
career life: 
“There was a situation two years ago in Darfur, it was a demonstration. We 
were with a UN representative it was sort of a friendly gathering turning to 
demonstration of frustration of being in the refugee camp, displacement camp. 
Most people have been there for three years and they were just incredibly 
frustrated and becoming politically motivated and active. Particularly the 
young people in the camp rather than traditionally following the direction of 
the oldest, they were becoming politically motivated and within two seconds a 
huge amount of anger developed because somebody pointed out a translator 
who had come with this big group of journalist and the UN people. Somebody 
said this guy was a spy and he was trying to get into our car. He was a 
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translator for Oxfam they said he was a government spy and he was holding 
my trousers trying to get into our vehicle and when I realized that they were 
trying to bit him up, than we were trying to pull him into vehicle when they 
were trying to stamp him. I just expected to see blood but they missed with 
the knife and we got him into vehicle and the crowd turned wild and had to 
tell the driver to get out from the situation. He was in complete panic cause 
the car was surrounded by people, the people started to stoning the vehicle 
cause they wanted to break through the windows and they started to break 
some of the windows and then we managed to get the driver to actually drive 
away and the crowd came after us and I thought we were lucky to get out of 
this situation and we almost stopped when we came to African Union 
peacekeepers encampment on the edge of the displacement camp. We decided 
ok we had some distance between the crowd that we must keep going to the 
nearest town and I am glad we didn’t stop cause the crowd get into this 
African Union compound and killed the translator there and they just once 
they decided they wanted a blood they wanted to kill somebody they will do it 
so I felt kind of fearful in that situation.” As was also the case in Rwanda, we 
cannot expect journalists to risk their lives in order to give us information.  
 A very significant difficulty for journalists was to getting interviews. The 
government restricted the interpreters to be only from Sudan and the 
translation was not always accurate. Ewen MasAskill describes his 
experience: 
 A government security man threatened the nurse for translating. A UN 
official then turned on the security man, who insisted that only a 
government-approved translator could be used. It was this melee that 
prompted the aid worker's angry "circus" remark. There was a lack of 
dignity about it all. (MacAskill 2004:2) 
The last obstacle mentioned by Thomson was the tight budget. If we look 
closely at how much money the TV organizations are spending for covering 
entertainment, sending one or two reporters to Darfur does not seem to cost a 
lot. This is only a matter of choice of the Directors and editors of TV 
networks. Kristof is saying: 
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If only Michael Jackson's trial had been held in Darfur. Last month, CNN, 
Fox News, NBC, MSNBC, ABC and CBS collectively ran 55 times as 
many stories about Michael Jackson as they ran about genocide in Darfur. 
(Kristof 2005:2).  
4.4 Media coverage improvements in Darfur  
 
It should not be forgotten that even though the media were not always 
present in Darfur, there still have been some improvements in coverage since 
Rwanda in 1994. The media are not alone anymore and there are new 
technologies, as well celebrities and different campaigns that are helping the 
media raise awareness of the conflict in Darfur. 
Several major newspapers provided comprehensive coverage, including 
outstanding reports by Nicholad Kristof at the New York Times, Emily 
Wax at the Washington Post, and Stephanie Nolen at the Globe and Mail. 
This coverage also included far more editorial responses than were printed 
during the Rwandan genocide, as print-media outlets assumed a greater 
sense of responsibility for alerting the public to urgent humanitarian crises. 
Television coverage was not nearly as consistent, with entertainment 
stories often eclipsing international news about Sudan. (Grzyb 2009:79).   
Nowadays there are some new technologies that did not exist in 1994. There 
are even video games where the people can navigate life in a refugee camp: 
Some of the savvier media campaigns include mtvU’s online video game, 
“Darfur is dying”, in which the user chooses a Darfurian victim identity 
and navigates life in a refugee camps. (Grzyb 2009:86).  
This game has been used in a very positive way to raise awareness of the 
people to what is happening in Darfur. There are also some other ways of 
telling the public how to change situation in Darfur. Sometimes when the 
media are hopeless and cannot change anything celebrities have bigger power. 
Actors like Mia Farrow, George Clooney and Don Cheadle use their celebrity 
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status to draw attention to the Darfur issue. De Waal mentions how George 
Clooney contributed to raise awareness of what is happening in Darfur: 
On 14 September 2006 the actor George Clooney addressed the UN 
Security Council and said that, should the Sudan government refuse to 
comply with Resolution 1706, ‘You will simply need men with shovels 
and bleached white linen and headstones. In many ways it’s unfair, but it 
is, nevertheless, true that this genocide will be on your watch. How you 
deal with it will be your legacy, your Rwanda, your Cambodia, your 
Auschwitz.’12 Two days later, tens of thousands of demonstrators donned 
blue hats to demand that Sudan allow in UN troops to stop genocide in 
Darfur.(De Waal 2007:4).  
George Clooney and Don Cheadle are very involved in rising awareness of 
what is happening in Darfur they played together in a movie “Darfur now” 
which drew a lot of international attention towards the genocide. There is also 
a special Google earth map of Darfur where you can click on the refugee 
camp and have a look on the conditions that people have to live in. All these 
ways of raising awareness were not possible during genocide in Rwanda 
because of the timeline. Large advocacy groups like “Save Darfur” or “Be a 
witness” have made use of promotional products like hats and T-shirts to 
promote stop the genocide message.  
In the Darfur conflict NGOS and aid agencies played a very important role in 
bringing Darfur to the public. In Grzyb’ s opinion it was not the media but 
other organizations and groups like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International and coalitions like 
“Save Darfur” that played more important role in putting pressure on the 
international community for intervention: 
While the media has played a role in keeping Darfur in the public, it is the 
NGOS and Darfur activist organizations that have truly kept up the 
pressure for international intervention(..)Without the efforts and advocacy 
of these organizations, media coverage would surely have continued to 
wane. (Grzyb 2009:83).  
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However the reports produced by NGOs are not written in the same way as 
the articles in newspapers which are objective and show two sides of the coin. 
In one of the first articles published in Britain, Eric Reeves gives attribute to 
Amnesty International to report on Darfur: 
Despite efforts by the regime, a slow and widening stream of information 
is reaching the international community, both from tens of thousands of 
refugees fleeing to Chad (which shares a long border with western Sudan), 
and from accounts coming precariously from within Darfur. Amnesty 
International has led the way in reporting on Darfur. (Reeves 2004:2) 
The campaign “Save Darfur” contributed a lot to raising awareness of Darfur. 
Sam Dealey in his article from New York Times says:  
Just last month, the House of Representatives passed the Darfur 
Accountability and Divestment Act and the United Nations Security 
Council decided to deploy up to 26,000 peacekeepers to Sudan. Both 
actions were due in no small way to the work of the Save Darfur Coalition. 
Through aggressive advertising campaigns, this group has done more than 
any other to focus world attention on the conflict in the Sudanese region. 
(Dealey 2007:2) 
Although the aid organizations were very active they also did not work full 
time to raise the awareness.  
Public advocacy by aid organizations decreased markedly during this 
period, especially in the latter half of 2005. This coincided with a period of 
(relative) calm in Darfur, when the peace talks at Abuja were ongoing and 
rebel movements had retreated to their strongholds. Since then, public 
advocacy by the six aid organizations has remained limited. (HPG Policy 
Brief 28, 2007:2)  
As we can observe there were periods of time when neither the media nor the 
aid agencies were telling world what is happening in Darfur and that was a 
big problem. Even though it is positive that the NGOS and other agencies 
were active and the high technology was used to raise the awareness of the 
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people the media pressure is still not sufficient and there is not enough 
coverage. 
It seems like the mistakes from Rwanda have been repeated and the media are 
again missinterpretating the situation in Darfur as they did in Rwanda. 
 The international media’s coverage of the Darfur conflict has been self-
evidently lacklustre. The very dynamics of the conflict has not even been 
adequately analysed or reported. Most coverage has taken at face value 
rebel claims that they are fighting against underdevelopment and 
marginalisation in Darfur. (The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council 
2004). 
Furthermore journalists also got the roots of the conflict wrong. 
The Washington Post’s editorial position has also neglected to note any 
Islamist involvement in the Darfur crisis, accepting rebel claims about 
“marginalisation” being the reason for the conflict. Interestingly, The 
Washington Post editorialists called on European countries to militarily 
intervene in Darfur, stating that “the United States is overcommitted 
militarily in Iraq and elsewhere”. (The European Sudanese Public Affairs 
Council 2004) 
Even The Independent which is considered to be a British newspaper that 
shows particular a interest in African issues has made its mistakes The 
Independent, has over the years established itself as a newspaper which 
showed a genuine interest in Africa and African issues. Sadly, its coverage 
of the Darfur crisis has demonstrated every shortcoming associated with 
Western media coverage of the continent: inaccurate reporting, 
sensationalism, prejudice and hypocrisy. In a mirror image of The 
Washington Post, The Independent’s editorial line has claimed that events 
in Darfur were genocide and has called for military intervention. (The 
European Sudanese Public Affairs Council 2004) 
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In Linda Melvern’s opinion neither international community nor the western 
media learnt much from the genocide in Rwanda. 
In 2005, with the ongoing and massive human rights abuses in Darfur, 
Sudan, it would seem that many of the lessons from the Rwandan genocide 
and the recommendations of the various international and national 
enquiries that took place afterwards have not resulted in an improved 
system to predict, to prevent or to even delay genocide. (Melvern 
2006:95). 
 Having seen all the improvement described before, this essay does not agree 
with Melvern’s opinion that nothing has been improved since the genocide in 
Rwanda. The media still have to learn a lot but thanks to the developed 
technology and efforts of the reporters, the media work has been improved to 
some extent. Former journalist Andrew Stroehlein is Media Director of the 
International Crisis Group asked people from Darfur what they think about 
the international media coverage he got following response: 
One said that there simply wasn't enough coverage of Darfur, but his 
colleague clarified this sentiment, saying that while news coverage and ad 
campaigns had raised the overall profile of the crisis in the West, not 
enough attention was given to the conflict between the government and 
government-sponsored forces on one hand, and rebel groups on the other. 
There was very little information in the mass media about the latest 
developments in the fighting and even less understanding of what the 
fighting was about. (Stroehlein 2006:1). 
Furthermore he is arguing that instead of writing about the conflict the media 
should concentrate more on how to deal with it and mobilize the international 
community to help people there. 
There's been very little on TV and too little in the print media that deals 
with the conflict aspect of this crisis and what can be done about it. We get 
some headline coverage every two or three months that a peace agreement 
has been reached between the warring parties, a UN resolution has been 
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passed, or a deal has been made between Khartoum and the UN -- just 
enough to make the average viewer/reader feel it's safe to turn away. But 
when that ceasefire is broken, the resolution runs into trouble, or Sudanese 
ministers reject a deal - that news is almost universally ignored by the very 
same mass media. (Stroehlein 2006:2) 
Allan Thompson in his article “A Responsibility to Report” argues that 
especially the North American media have not improved their work since the 
Rwanda genocide: 
By most accounts, North American media have drastically underplayed the 
situation in western Sudan, just as they did in Rwanda, despite evidence of 
massive violations of human rights and a government supporting forces 
wreaking havoc on innocent civilians. Perhaps, just perhaps, content 
analysis would demonstrate that Darfur has registered on the media radar 
screen to a greater degree than did Rwanda. But it has not become a mega 
–story or a media sensation. It has not captured our imaginations. And that 
signals, once again, a media failure. (Thompson 2007:434) 
 There is a lot of criticism about the Darfur media coverage but it should not 
be forgotten to concentrate on the question set at the beginning: What role the 
media played in Darfur? This essay argues that media influence was very 
crucial in influencing public opinion and help in raising money for the 
victims. Another important issue is that a media together with help of 
celebrities and aid agencies are raising awareness of the conflict. The media 
played a role and are still quite active in covering Darfur and we can read and 
see a lot of news coverage of the accusations of President Bashir. Is this all 
enough? Apparently it is not, as we can see it from the reaction of 
international community. What should be improved in the media coverage in 
order to make a significant difference? As the journalist Anthony Sampson 
wrote in The Independent in 2004: ”How much more serious does the world 
crisis have to become before our media accept responsibility to present 
viewers and readers with a balanced picture of the real issues that lie behind 
it.? (Sampson 2004:39).  Bacon has some ideas how to make the things work 
better in the future: 
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In Darfur, thousands of people died before the world took notice. Some of 
them might be alive today if the press had found ways to move more 
quickly, such as bypassing Sudanese restrictions by entering Sudan from 
Chad, reporting through the eyes of refugees in Chad, or paying more heed 
to reports and pictures from human rights groups. (Bacon 2004:1) 
 From what journalists are saying a lot of them risked their lives to go to Chad 
and report from there. Ewen MacAskill says: 
Once one journalist began reporting from the region, other media outlets 
felt obliged to follow suit. Suddenly, Darfur was the place to be. Because 
of restrictions by the Sudanese government on travel to Darfur, the media 
operations initially concentrated on neighbouring Chad, where about 
100,000 refugees had fled, and some journalists made illegal trips into 
Darfur from there. (MacAskill 2004:2). 
In his opinion when one journalist starts to report about one topic than it 
becomes priority for other newspapers. 
It should not be forgotten that aid organizations are doing their best to help 
media. Also campaigns like “Save Darfur” are quite successful and a lot of 
movies about Darfur has been released in last four years. In 2005 the Center 
for American Progress and the Genocide Intervention Fund established an 
initiative “Be a Witness” calling the TV networks to increase the coverage of 
Darfur. There are lot of initiatives and things are on its way to improve.  
In Beardsley’s opinion: In order to mobilize national and public will, the 
media must be consistently engaged (Beardsley 2009:48). As was shown 
before the media were not consistently engaged in Darfur. There were some 
peaks and downs. Even now we hear a lot about Darfur but it is more about 
the accusations of President Bashir by the ICC (International Criminal Court) 
for committing war crimes rather than what is happening with people there 
and how to help them. The fact is that Bashir is still a president and the 
situation in his country did not improve. The court has no power of arrest and 
the accusations of Mr Bashir made the things even worse as he blocked some 
aid agencies: 
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A defiant President Bashir lambasted the West for the indictment and 
ordered 13 aid organizations serving millions of people in Darfur to 
suspend their operations on accusations that they provided false evidence 
to the court. (Adario 2009:1) 
 Mr Bashir feels free to do whatever he wants because as we can see there is 
no way for international community to achieve a justice here. The media 
should concentrate more on what could be done in order to put this man 
behind bars.  
Another very important aspect of media coverage is to put pressure on 
countries like China so they can force Sudan to allow deployment of troops. 
Another thing that could be improved is that the media should put more effort 
in how they present the reality and the facts. They already made a mistake in 
Rwanda by describing the genocide as a “tribal war”. They should not repeat 
this mistake by presenting what is happening in Darfur as a war between 
“Arabs and the Blacks”. They should check their information more carefully 
and underline more often the fact that what is happening in Darfur is 
genocide.  They have a huge moral responsibility in showing the facts to the 
public. 
Reporting the news is both a political and a moral act. An element of 
shame is involved in not reporting responsibly and reporting equitably. If 
the media don’t bear witness truthfully and thoughtfully, the good/bad 
stereotypes endure and the lack of concern persists.” (The European 
Sudanese Public Affairs Council 2004) 
Media still have to learn a lot and make its work more efficient. 10 years 
after what happened in Rwanda it might be expected that all these things 
should have been already improved. Dr. Martin Luther King once said "Our 
lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter". The 
world should not be silent about Darfur. The Media, by highlighting the 
genocide, can change lives of victims and refugees in Darfur. 
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4.5 Local Media in Sudan 
The role of the local media in Sudan, particularly in comparison with the 
Rwandan genocide, will be discussed. We cannot speak here of the “hate 
media”, as was clearly the case in Rwanda. However, the local media still 
played an important role in shaping the minds of the population in Sudan. 
First of all, the government of Sudan totally controls both radio and television 
in the country, so it has influence on the content of the news. In 2005, the US 
Department of State reported following: 
The government of Sudan directly controlled radio and television and 
required that they reflect government policies, and television has a 
permanent military censor to ensure that the news reflected official views. 
(U.S Department of State: 2006) 
The government of Sudan (GOS) seeks to control all news about Sudan. 
Sudan’s police and intelligence agencies, both civilian and military, regulate 
the movements of journalists, domestic and foreign. Government interference 
spans a broad spectrum of responses including lengthy interviews by the 
police, detention in cells, beatings and torture of journalists, and the 
suspension and closing of media outlets. (U.S Department of State:2006) 
Local media very often misreported statements made by western officials. 
When Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary general visited Sudan in May 
2005, the Sudanese government media twisted Annan’s statement about their 
government. 
In its version (local media), in his meeting with Foreign Minister Isma’il, 
Annan had focused on rebel atrocities in Darfur, emphasized his 
appreciation of Sudan’s cooperation with the UN, and underscored the 
government positive role in accomplishing the Southern Sudan peace 
agreement. The government in Sudan omitted completely from its reports 
Annan’s criticism of the government. Rather, the Sudan News Agency 
reported on 31 May that Annan was overwhelmed by the positive 
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developments in Darfur and has complimented the government of Sudan 
for respecting the Darfur ceasefire. (Chalk, Kelton 2009:117) 
The second official guest from the USA, Condoleeza Rice, came in July 2005. 
She came to discuss the issue of human rights violations in Sudan with 
President al-Bashir. Brinkley in his article writes:  
When US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice came to Khartoum in July 
2005, US journalists travelling with her were manhandled by Sudanese 
security personnel and barred from the meeting between Rice and al-
Bashir. No official Sudanese government media mentioned this event, 
although Rice released a statement declaring that she was outraged and 
demanded official apology. (Brinkley 2005:2) 
The Sudanese media was very critical about Rice visit to Khartoum:  
She delivered a strong message to President al-Bashir, declaring that his 
government had a “credibility problem” and that she wanted to see 
“actions not words” by his government to quell the violence in West 
Darfur. (Sudan Tribune 2005:2)  
When the first reports about possibility of existence of the “genocide” in 
Sudan appeared, the Government of Sudan tried to disguise the truth and 
explained the situation as western propaganda. 
 The carefully worded UN report provoked what appears to be the 
Sudanese government’s media’s first public admission to its own people 
that the world suspected Sudan of genocide in Darfur. Through the 
summer and fall of 2004, the Sudanese domestic media vigorously 
responded to the mention of the word “genocide”. Radio Sudan declared 
that any suggestion of genocide was simply Western propaganda reflecting 
Zionist influence and Western jealousy of Sudan’s great wealth and rich 
culture. (Chalk, Kelton 2009:118)   
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It is well known that the Government of Sudan does not want to have any UN 
troops in its country and pretends in front of the whole world that the situation 
in Sudan is “not so bad” as the western media presents. 
The Government of Sudan emphasizes any evidence it can create that its 
policies in Darfur are humanitarian, successful, and have the situation under 
control. Under pressure to accept UN troops, Sudan launched an anti-measles 
campaign, triumphantly trumpeted on Sudan TV as if the belated 
immunization of children driven into refugee camps with their families, 
suffering from dehydration and malnutrition and threatened with rape if they 
search the countryside for firewood, will somehow compensate for the deaths 
of some 270,000 Darfurians, most of them children and elderly persons. 
(Reeves 2006:2) 
There is a big difference between the work of the radio and the work of the 
TV in Sudan.  As was the case in Rwanda, only a small percentage of the 
public could afford to buy newspapers but everybody could afford to listen to 
the radio. That is why the Government did not inform the public about the UN 
actions through the radio. In Sudan majority of the people listens to the radio 
as well so the Government does not allow transmitting information about UN 
actions. 
The strange thing is that radio in Sudan never mentions the presence of the 
UN military while the TV regularly broadcast presence of the UN troops in 
the south. Such dual channelling of vital information is a perfect 
illustration of the government’s practice of entrusting information to the 
domestic elite audience with access to Sudan TV and government 
websites, while keeping radio listeners, the majority of Sudanese, in the 
dark. (Chalk, Kelton 2009:118) 
One interesting point of note is how the officials in Sudan do not care about 
the UN sanctions and resolutions: 
Just a week before the 30 August 2004 deadline set by the UN Security 
Council for the Sudanese government to face sanctions unless it started 
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protecting civilians and disarmed its forces, Sudanese official and chief 
negotiator Majzoub al- Khalifa had rejected Nigerian President and 
African Union Chairman Olusegun Obasanajo’s call for 2,000 AU troops 
to enter Darfur. Al-Khalifa insisted that the government would itself carry 
out the disarmament of its Janjaweed milita and the rebel groups: “The 
security role is the role of the government of Sudan and its security forces” 
he declared concluding: “If there is a need, it will be discussed”. (PBS 
Online Newshour 2004:2)  
Finally, after the GOS agreed to allow the African Union troops to enter the 
country, none of the media reported the fact to the public. 
None of these assurances that Sudan recognized a role of the AU were 
announced on Sudan Radio but limited instead to Sudan TV and one English 
language press release from the Sudan News Agency. (Chalk, Kelton 
2009:118) 
The Government of Sudan manipulates the media as much as it can. In 
Chalk’s and Kelton’s opinion, the GOS uses Sudan TV and websites of the 
Sudanese News Agency to anticipate policy changes and shape the 
reactions to them among Sudan’s educated elite. The government acts as if 
it fears and respects the potential for political activism among educated 
Sudanese. Radio Sudan, on the other hand, addresses poor workers and 
farmers with little time for politics and anti-government activities. Radio 
Sudan rarely anticipated policy changes (Chalk, Kelton 2009:118). 
The local media in Sudan do not play such an important role as it did during 
the Rwandan genocide. However, it still has an effect. As long as the 
Government of Sudan denies what is happening in Sudan, the human rights 
violations will continue to take place. The UN permanent members, 
particularly China, should put stricter sanctions on Sudan.  It looks like the 
Government does not care what the UN says so maybe it will take more 
notice when the countries it is particularly dependent on start to take action. 
John Prendergast advisor to the International Crisis Group wrote: 
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The regime in Khartoum has taken the measure of the international 
community and believes it will face no consequence for continuing to 
support the Janjaweed and blocking a UN peacekeeping mission. As one 
high-ranking Sudanese government official brazenly told me this week, 
“The United Nations Security Council has threatened us so many times we 
no longer take it seriously. The state of impunity and arrogance is 
dangerous to the international system and deadly to the people in Darfur” 
(Prendergast 2006:1) 
 The GOS should no longer support the militia in its country and control the 
media by denying everything what it does. Media should report about human 
rights violations and the role that President Bashir plays in the conflict. It is 
still not too late for the international community to take stronger action and it 
is not too late for the international media to put the pressure on the 
international actors and International Criminal Court to stop the killings by 
putting President Bashir in jail.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
We now return to the questions set at the beginning of this section; ‘What 
role did the media play in Darfur and why did the international interest in the 
conflict appear so late?’ At the beginning of the conflict, in 2003, there was 
no media coverage and so we cannot analyse whether there was any 
influence. After the coverage started to occurr in 2004, when US officials 
called it genocide, the international media did put a little bit of a pressure on 
the international community by accusing the United Nations and other 
organizations of denying the fact that genocide was taking place. 
Most of the international community, including the United Nations, the 
European Union, and the African Union, has denied that genocide is taking 
place. It may be that these articles are indeed indexing the international 
political elite when describing events in Darfur. (Zagorski 2009:12).  
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It could be a coincidence that the UN Commission was created just a couple 
of weeks after the American verdict, describing Darfur as genocide, and the 
resulting pressure from the media.  The media also pushed people to donate 
money for the victims of the conflict. On the other hand it can be argued that 
a bigger role was played by the aid organizations than the media itself in 
raising awareness of the conflict and putting pressure on the international 
community for intervention. So why did the international interest appear so 
late? Firstly, the obstacles previously mentioned in this chapter such as the 
restrictions to get into the country set by the Government of Sudan. Secondly, 
the danger that journalists had to face in order to report from Sudan. Thirdly, 
a lack of interest in Africa as had been the case in Rwanda. Finally, other 
ongoing world affairs which the media gave priority to report about, such as 
the Iraq war or natural disasters. 
 Surely there have been improvements in conflict coverage since Rwanda 
but these improvements proved not to be enough. It is clear that the coverage 
of Darfur was inconsistent and not focused enough on the negative role of the 
GOS. Not enough pressure was put on the GOS to stop it supporting the 
Janjaweed. The media should be focusing more on proposing solutions and 
urging the international actors to put more sanctions on Sudan in order to stop 
the genocide.  
 
5. RWANDA AND DARFUR COMPARISON 
 
There is a reason why Darfur is called by some journalists and politicians 
“another Rwanda”. After the Second World War, the world said “never 
again” and the genocide in Rwanda took place. After this genocide, the people 
again promised themselves “never again” and now after 10 years of tragedy in 
Rwanda, the same thing happened in Darfur. The question that comes to our 
mind is, when this will stop? This chapter will compare the media coverage of 
Darfur and Rwanda and will try to answer the question of whether the media 
improved their coverage in Darfur or was the media performance even worse? 
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The first section will focus on the general differences and similarities between 
the two conflicts, as they are important for understanding the media coverage. 
The second sections will focus only on the comparison between the media 
coverage in Rwanda and Darfur and the role of use of the word “genocide”. 
There were some significant differences between the conflicts in Darfur 
and Rwanda which influenced the media coverage in both cases. First of 
all, the genocide in Rwanda lasted for three months while the conflict in 
Darfur started in 2003 and is still ongoing. The Darfur conflict was in its 
second year before the news media started to cover it. This gave the media  
time to prepare and gather information on the conflict. This was not the 
case in Rwanda. Secondly, 800,000 people were estimated to have died in 
the conflict in Rwanda during the first three months.  The estimated 
number of victims in Darfur since 2003 is 300,000 (BBC Sudan and Darfur 
conflict).  
The cause of the conflict is also different. In Rwanda, it was a fight over 
positions of power in the government while in Darfur it was more about the 
recognition of the peripheries and basic rights of the people living there. But 
in both cases, Hutu and the Blacks were discriminated and in the end killed. 
Melvern recognizes lot of differences but also similarities between Darfur and 
Rwanda. 
There are important differences between the tragedies of Rwanda and 
Darfur, but there are also some similarities- notably the issue of whether 
state sovereignty should deter international action, an emphasis on keeping 
an existing peace process on track and not confronting human rights abuses 
for fear of upsetting that process, and a tardy and inadequate response to a 
crisis in Africa by the United Nations Security Council. The similarities 
also extend to the failure of the western press to adequately report the scale 
and brutality of ongoing human rights abuses and their underlying causes, 
and to supply timely information about the how UN policy is arrived at 
within the Security Council. (Melvern 2006:95) 
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This essay does not agree with Linda’s Melvern opinion as it is extremely 
difficult to inform the public about what is going on in the Security Council 
because everything is happening behind the closed doors. The meetings are 
not monitored and there are no official records how the decisions are being 
made. The blame cannot be put just on the journalists because it is impossible 
for them to get the information out of the Security Council. 
Another difference between Darfur and Rwanda was the state policy. The 
USA did not have a strict policy with respect to Darfur whereas it did with 
Rwanda. Accordingly to the CNN effect, when a country’s policy is not 
already certain, the media can have a bigger impact on the policy.  
5.1 Rwanda, Darfur Media Coverage Comparison 
It is important to mention the role the term “genocide” in the media. In the 
Darfur case, Colin Powell defined it as genocide in 2004 so the policy had to 
change. In the case of Rwanda, the situation was different as the word 
“genocide” was avoided through three months of the conflict. The only person 
who mentioned it was General Dallaire who used it in May 1994. 
Dallaire included the term for the first time in his situation report during the 
last week in April.  
Reuters quoted him on April 30 warning, “Unless the international 
community acts, it may find it is unable to defend itself against accusations 
of doing nothing to stop genocide”. And he began using the term 
confidently in May. Even after he had adopted the label however, he left 
the semantic battles to others. “I didn’t get bogged down in the debate over 
the genocide terminology”, he remembers “We had enough proof that it 
was genocide, and for those who didn’t agree, we had crimes against 
humanity on a massive scale. What more did we need to know what we 
had to do?” (Powell 2002:258)  
Even though it was clearly genocide in Powell’s eyes, it was not enough and 
the Clinton Administration continued to avoid answering the question of 
whether what was happening in Rwanda was genocide. 
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In the case of the Clinton Administration, labelling events in Rwanda as 
genocide was tantamount to sponsoring another peacekeeping operation in 
Africa. Coming so soon after the political fallout from the failures in 
Somalia, The Clinton Administration believed there to be little domestic 
support for such an operation, and therefore took all possible precautions 
to prevent the label of “genocide” to be applied to events on the ground. 
(Barnett 2002:42). 
In the case of Darfur, they could not prevent this very powerful word from 
being used. But even when it was used also in the media, it still did not make 
a significant impact. In order to find out how many times the word genocide 
was used in context with Rwanda and Darfur, research was conducted using 
the Lexis-Nexis database. The period of time used for the research was for 
Rwanda was from 6 of April 1994, when the plane with president 
Habyarimana was shot down, until 18 July, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
took over power. In Darfur, the research starts on the 22 March of 2004 with 
Kapila statement, until May 2006, when the peace agreement was signed. In 
Table 1, we can see the use of the word genocide in both conflicts.  
Table 1: Use of term genocide with Rwanda and Darfur (source Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source  Rwanda (6April 1994-18 
July 1994) 
Darfur(22March 
2004-6May2006) 
Guardian 1 6 
The New York 
Times 
2 26 
Le Monde 3 Not mentioned 
84 
 
In the New York Times, genocide in Darfur was mentioned 26 times while 
genocide in Rwanda was only mentioned twice. What is quite surprising is 
that French newspaper Le Monde described Rwanda 3 times as genocide 
while never mentioned this word in context with Darfur although it was 
mentioned officially by the US administration. Before Colin Powell 
mentioned the word “genocide” officially, it was used only 8 times in the 
media (although never though in Le Monde). After 9 September 2004 until 
2006 it was used 23 times (again, never in Le Monde). As we can see, the 
media waited for the officials to take the responsibility and call it genocide. 
After that, they started to write more about genocide in Darfur but the 
question is, was this enough?  In the case of Rwanda, with the exception of 
Dallaire’s statement in May 1994, there was no official statements that 
mentioned the term ‘genocide’. Between 6 April and 30 May1994 the 
Guardian and the New York Times never mentioned genocide in the context 
of Rwanda, le Monde mentioned it once. After Dallaire’s statement, the word 
genocide never appeared in le Monde and it appeared 3 times in the Guardian 
and the New York Times. Dallaire’s statement was not as important as Colin 
Powell’s statement and so it made hardly any difference for the media. After 
the word ‘genocide’ had been used, the international actors started to debate 
the conflict more often but they did not really do a lot to stop the killing. In 
the graphic below, there is not an obvious increase of articles mentioning the 
genocide after Colin Powell’s statement. There did not appear to be a 
significant connection between the use of the word “genocide” and the big 
peaks in media coverage: 
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Graphic 1. Darfur Media coverage (source Lexis- Nexis) 
 
In Samantha Power’s opinion, even the use of the word genocide and the 
drastic pictures on TV showing the Rwandan conflict did not manage to push 
the US to take any steps to stop the killings: 
Even after the reality of genocide in Rwanda had become irrefutable, when 
bodies were shown choking the Kagera River on America’s nighlty news, 
the brute fact of the slaughter failed to influence U.S policy except in a 
negative way. As they had done in Bosnia, American officials again 
sunned the g-word. They were afraid that using it would have obliged the 
United States to act under the terms of 1948 genocide convention. (Power 
2002:359) 
In Zagorski’s opinion, the US administration did not influence other countries 
and organizations to call the events in Darfur a ‘genocide’. 
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Although the Bush Administration remains steadfast in its characterization 
of Darfur as genocide, this is not a widely held belief. Most of the 
international community, including the United Nations, the European 
Union, and the African Union, has denied that the genocide is taking place. 
It may be that these articles are indeed indexing the international political 
elite when describing events in Darfur. (Zagorski 2009:17)  
 Another difference between Darfur and Rwanda media coverage is that in 
Darfur the journalists were better informed so they could transfer correct 
information to the TV headquarters.  
In Caplan’s opinion Darfur was big news. This was unlike Rwanda. 
Clinton and Annan knew all about Rwanda, but media coverage for many 
weeks was both minimal and distorted ("tribal savagery") so the public 
remained largely uninformed. (Caplan 2009:35)  
 
In the table below differences and similarities in covering both conflicts are 
shown. We can see that journalists generally had an easier task covering 
Darfur than Rwanda. Different factors were taken under consideration like 
level of danger, development of technology, access to the country where the 
conflict took place. It turned out that in Darfur journalists were better 
prepared, had better knowledge and better technology. Unfortunately, the 
coverage did not increase enough as we would wish. 
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Table 2. Rwanda and Darfur comparison of the conditions for media 
coverage 
Difficulties Rwanda Darfur 
Dangerous for 
journalists life 
More dangerous than 
Darfur.  
Less dangerous 
Difficult access to the 
country 
Yes Difficult but possible to 
report from Chad 
Level of journalists 
knowledge of the 
conflict 
Very poor Good (journalists had a 
lot of time to prepare 
and research as the 
conflict lasted for a long 
time) 
Number of international 
journalists being on the 
ground at the beginning 
of the conflict 
None None 
More important events 
to report 
Bosnia 
Elections in South 
Africa 
Iraq war 
Transfer of information 
outside of the country 
Difficult( no interest in 
small country in Africa, 
logistic problems) 
Easier (developed 
technology, more 
journalists on the ground 
but entertainment still 
priority for the public 
over humanitarian 
crises) 
Use of the term 
“genocide” 
Almost never Very often since Sept 
2004 
Role of the  NGOS Marginal  Significant 
 
88 
 
In order to compare how many articles have been written on Rwanda and 
Darfur, the Lexis- Nexis database has been used, as it has in previous 
chapters. The timeline has been set for the both conflicts. The Rwanda 
coverage was measured from 6 April 1994 when President Habyarimana died 
in a plane crash, because this was the time when the media started to write 
about Rwanda. The last date was 18 July 1994 when Rwandan Patriotic Front 
took over the power. This was the moment where the media stopped writing 
about Rwanda. In Darfur, the situation was slightly different because of the 
unfolding conflict. In the beginning of the conflict the media were silent and 
there were no articles about Darfur. The time when the media coverage 
started to be interested in what was happening in Darfur was 22 March 2004 
when Mr Kapila described Darfur as the “greatest humanitarian disaster”. The 
Darfur conflict is still ongoing in the news but in order to compare it more 
effectively with Rwanda, the analysis was conducted up until the moment 
when the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja in Nigeria in May 
2006. This was the moment where the conflict should have come to an end. 
This was unfortunately not the case. The research was done on major 
international newspapers; one from the United Kingdom the Guardian, one 
from the United States the New York Times and one from France Le Monde. 
If we have a closer look on the numbers from Table 3, it is not surprising that 
the number of articles in the Darfur coverage is higher than in Rwanda. But it 
should not be forgotten that the period of time for the Rwanda coverage was 
just three months, whereas for Darfur it was over two years. However, the 
number shows that in case of Le Monde, there were more articles covering 
Rwanda, even though Darfur lasted for a longer time. We can notice here the 
national interests of France in Rwanda. If we take into account the number of 
articles from The New York Times and divide it into months, it turns out that 
there were 107 articles every month during the genocide on Rwanda and only 
27 a month on Darfur. 
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Table 3: News coverage of Rwanda and Darfur (source Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After doing the research using the Lexis-Nexis database and counting the 
number of articles that were published about Rwanda and Darfur, it can be 
concluded that there was a rise in the number of articles on Darfur but not as 
significant as we would expect from the media after 10 years of media 
failures in Rwanda. In April 1994, the number of articles about Rwanda 
reached 1457. This includes the press from Europe, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. The conflict in Darfur lasted much longer than Rwanda 
and, at its peak in July 2004, media coverage reached 1652 articles. In 
September 2006, it reached 1710 articles. However, lots of articles about 
Darfur were only published because of the presence of celebrities in Darfur. 
Eric Reeve in 2006 wrote: 
 
As Rwanda marks a grim twelfth anniversary, we must accept that while 
vast human destruction in Darfur has unfolded plainly before us, we have 
again done little more than watch, offering only unprotected humanitarian 
assistance while some 450,000 people have perished as a result of 
violence, as well as consequent malnutrition and disease. (Reeves 
2009:153). 
Major 
newspapers 
Rwanda (number of 
articles) 
Darfur (number 
of articles) 
 
The Guardian 
214 319 
The New York 
Times 
322 745 
Le Monde 
 
648 297 
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 Looking at the statistics, it is sad to conclude that even though the coverage 
of Darfur was bigger than in Rwanda, taking into account the period of both 
conflicts, there was not a sufficient improvement in Darfur coverage. Listoe 
compares the two conflicts: 
Compressed into only one hundred days, the Rwandan genocide did, 
perhaps, leave room to claim, as many did, that they could not, in Mosse’s 
terms, imagine the depths of the truth. Darfur, on the other hand, has been 
a slow, relentless refusal, one measured in unfolding years, seemingly 
without end. The dead and displaced, those entrenched in the internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps and scattered into Chad, live through the 
brutal cycles of war, assault, killings, burnings, rape starvation, and 
traumatic shock. The victim’s experiences have been represented and 
disseminated around the world, but those representations circulate outside 
the economy of talk that shapes Darfur as a matter of political discussion, 
debate or concern. (Listoe 2009:257)  
On the other hand if we do not just take the numbers into account, it turns out 
that there were still some improvements in the Darfur coverage. Unlike in 
Rwanda, NGOS and other aid organizations played quite important role in 
raising awareness of the conflict. Secondly, the reports and articles were quite 
comprehensive and better researched than those about Rwanda: 
Several major newspapers provided comprehensive coverage, including 
outstanding reports by Nicholas Kristof at the New York Times, Emily Wax 
at the Washington Post, and Stephanie Nolen at the Globe and Mail. This 
coverage also included far more editorial responses than were printed 
during the Rwandan genocide, as print- media outlets assumed a greater 
sense of responsibility for alerting the public to urgent humanitarian crises. 
(Grzyb 2009:79). 
 Another important thing in covering Darfur is that it was a long term conflict 
which gave time to scholars, journalists and bloggers to update their 
information and develop new things every day. Examples include the 
computer game about Darfur mentioned in the previous chapter. Also, 
campaigns like “Save Darfur” did not exist in Rwanda because there was not 
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really time to do that during the three month period.  The work of the 
newspapers in Grzyb’s opinion significantly improved: 
Not only did the paper avoid many of the mistakes evident in its 1994 
coverage of Rwanda, it carried quotes and commentaries that called Darfur 
“another Rwanda”, referencing, albeit indirectly, its own culpability in the 
meagre international response there. (Grzyb 2009:82) 
As we can see, we can not completely criticize the media as there are lot of 
evidence for improvements made in the media coverage since 1994. 
Nevertheless, the media still made many mistakes. 
 
5.2 Local media comparison 
 
When considering the local media in both cases, the difference is quite clear. 
The local media in Darfur are not a Hate media as was the case in Rwanda. 
The only similarity here is the position of the super powers; the USA did not 
jam the radio in Rwanda, even though the radio was contributing significantly 
to the genocide 
The United States did almost nothing to try to stop the genocide. Ahead of 
the April 6 plane crash, the United States ignored extensive early warnings 
about imminent mass violence. It denied a Belgian request to reinforce the 
peacekeeping mission (..) The United States did not deploy its technical 
assets to jam Rwandan hate radio, and it did not lobby to have the 
genocidal Rwandan government’s ambassador expelled from the United 
Nations. (Power 2002:335).  
More pressure should be put on the government of Sudan which is controlling 
the local media. Because of that, people stay uninformed and president Bashir 
can claim that instead of 300,000, only 10,000 people have died (BBC Sudan 
and Darfur conflict 2009) 
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5.3 Conclusion 
  
We now return to the question of whether the media improved their 
coverage in Darfur or whether the media performance was even worse. This 
essay argues that the media improved the coverage of Darfur over Rwanda 
but not to the degree they could/should have. The coverage was still 
insufficient and not enough pressure has been put on the Government of 
Sudan. Particular countries seem to ignore Darfur as they ignored Rwanda. 
There are many areas where the media did play a positive role in raising 
money for the refugees and victims but more should be done to finally end the 
conflict. There should be more training for journalists who are going to 
Africa, more funds from TV stations should be given to cover “not important” 
enough countries for the western world and less money should be spend on 
entertainment. Hate media in countries like Rwanda should be forbidden and 
more restrictions should be put on the GOS in order to give people more 
information from outside. If these conditions will be fulfilled maybe we won’t 
have to repeat ourselves by saying “never again”. 
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6. FINAL CONCLUSION  
 
It is now time to come back to set in the beginning hypothesis. This essay 
has proven that Mass Media play important role in forming public opinion. 
People after watching news are deciding to donate money and are putting 
pressure on their governments to intervene. In case of Rwanda it was not 
enough coverage and that is why there was not enough pressure from the 
society side to intervene because people though it was only a tribal war. This 
essay has shown that in case of Rwanda it there had been more coverage 
public opinion would have been mobilized and politicians would have to have 
reacted faster. It can also be claimed that the media bear the responsibility for 
misinterpretation what was going on in Rwanda. It was also shown that TV 
puts pressure not only on the society but also on politicians. Big influence had 
pictures of starving children in Somalia on President Bush who decided after 
watching TV to “do something about it”. 
 
Another important issue is that if there are more correspondents on the ground 
with better knowledge of the situation the bigger impact has it on the policy- 
making. (Rotberg, Weiss 1996:150). In Rwanda case reporters were not good 
prepared, their knowledge of the conflict was very basic and that is why they 
very often  gave people wrong information. Darfur case showed that even 
though journalists had more time to prepare and gather information the 
conflict was still shown as a war between “Arabs and Blacks” which very 
often confused people. The mistake was made again. The last hypothesis 
made by Allen: 
The role of the media is important because it affects what the outside world 
does about the conflicts. (Allen 1999:35). 
This applies definitely to each case study. The graphics and tables in this 
essay have shown that the coverage in Darfur was bigger than in Rwanda but 
the conflict in Darfur last longer. Thank to Lexis-Nexis database and research 
of the number of articles in each month it was easy to observe that the 
coverage was inconsistent and was bigger when a celebrity showed interest in 
Darfur or when an important person such as Colin Powell called it genocide. 
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This inconsistent in coverage caused dropping in interest of public opinion. 
But it was still much bigger than in case of Rwanda. In Darfur not only media 
played an important role but also campaign like “Save Darfur” made a big 
difference. Thank to also many celebrities like George Clooney attention do 
Darfur conflict was drown which lead to big donations. The role of the film 
cannot be forgotten. The number of movies made about Rwanda and Darfur 
are quite high. Unfortunately nothing more could have been done about 
Rwanda when the movies were released while in case of Darfur people still 
could have made a difference. Movies like “Ghost of Rwanda” or “Darfur 
now” should shock the viewer and push him/her towards doing something so 
the “genocide” could never happen again. 
 
It is time to answer the questions set in the beginning of this essay: What 
role do the media play in conflict? What kind of impact do they have on the 
policy makers? As Jamie Metzl said before”Mass media reaches not only 
people's homes, but also their minds, shaping their thoughts and sometimes 
their behaviour”. There is no doubt that media play very important role in 
politics. Everybody reads newspapers; listen to the radio and watches TV. 
Politicians do that as well, even if they do not decide to make a difference in 
the end there will always be pressure from the society side and in a indirect 
way it will influence the decision on intervening. Jean Seaton is convinced 
that the media have a very strong impact on the policy- making:  
 
It is evident that the media do have an impact on policy-making. Ironically, 
this is most powerful on either end of the process of intervention, the 
decision to go in, the decision to pull out, when policies themselves are 
uncertain, or weakly held. Politicians should perhaps complain less about 
what the media make them do, and devote more energy to how they make 
policy in the new uncertainties of the post-Cold world. (Seaton 1999:55) 
 
 According to the CNN effect and different opinions of scholars sometimes it 
can be weaker influence and sometimes stronger. It was weak in the case of 
Rwanda but because there was not enough coverage it was strong in case of 
Somalia but it can also be arguable if the intervention would have taken place 
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anyway without media pressure. In Darfur the coverage was bigger but it was 
still not enough for the international community to take stronger actions. 
300,000 people died and the situation in the country is not stable. President 
Bashir is still a President in Sudan and nothing has been done to put him 
behind the bars. This essay has shown that the impact of the media is different 
depending on the policy towards a certain country. As Robinson said  
When the policy certainty decreases, news media influence increases and 
that, as policy becomes more certain, the influence of news media 
coverage is reduced. (Robinson 2002:25) 
This was proven in case of Iraq and in case of Somalia. There was no interest 
in Rwanda in a small forgotten country in Africa. The USA policy was very 
certain towards non intervention that even though the media showed horrible 
scenes on TV countries still decided to withdraw their troops. Maybe if there 
had been more coverage, maybe if the conflict was not explained as a tribal 
war but was a genocide from the beginning maybe this could make a 
difference for other countries like the UK or France but it would not have 
made a big difference for the decision of the USA. In Darfur even though the 
war was called genocide it still did not make a huge difference and just after 
Colin Powell called Darfur a genocide  it was wiped from the newspapers and 
TV screens and replaced by the Tsunami in Asia. Prunier is convinced that in 
case of Darfur there is no political will that is why the situation is not 
improving and countries like Iraq or Afghanistan are bigger priority for the 
USA. 
 
The example of Afghanistan and even more of Iraq are cases in point, 
proving that when the political will is there (and this because we and not 
some exotic far-away human beings have been the victims), the means, 
financial, military and diplomatic, do suddenly materialize. (Prunier 
2005:148) 
 
The media play definitely very important role in influencing the foreign 
policy. The recent elections in Iran show that TV stations such as BBC can 
have enormous influence on shaping the public opinion in this country so big 
that it was banned by the government. 
96 
 
 
 Most recently the launch in January by the BBC of a Persian-language 
television channel has roused the ire of the Iranian regime. Whatever the 
BBC’s claims to editorial independence, the authorities in Teheran have 
denounced the channel as “suspicious and illegal”.Despite their best efforts 
to block it, it has proved popular in Iran, where satellite dishes are illegal 
and the state broadcaster dominates the airwaves. BBC Persian increased 
its time on air by five hours a day to 13 for four days after the election, 
further convincing some that it its tool of the British government. 
(Economist 2009:30)  
 
This only shows how big powers the media have and how important they are 
in shaping the public opinion.  
 
The World Service claimed that, since the current protests began, 
BBCPersian.com has experienced a huge growth in usage, despite being 
partially blocked in Iran 
(Guardian 2009:1) 
 
This essay focused not only on the role of the international media but has also 
shown the role of the local media in Rwanda and Darfur. It has been proven 
that media can also be a dangerous tool of genocide as it was the case in 
Rwanda. Hate Media there were inciting people to kill and it was not stopped 
by the international community. There are also other examples nowadays of 
the Hate Media in other countries like Zimbabwe or Ivory Coast. After having 
seen what happened in Rwanda the international community should never 
allow that something similar will happen again. In countries like Sudan there 
is no presence of the Hate Media but the local media are also controlled by 
the government and are restricted how to show the politics so the local people 
are not really aware of what is happening in their own country. This is 
probably why President Bashir is still in power in country like Sudan where 
the local media are totally controlled by the government and why for example 
in Iran people are demonstrating against new elected president. This is 
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because except of the local media that are washing their brains, BBC Persian 
is also present against the will of the government. 
 
The media play and should play even more important role, unfortunately as 
recent event of Michael Jackson death show something totally different. The 
research made by Global Language Monitor shows that the pop star death 
was the biggest online news in this decade: 
Only the election of President Barack Obama to the White House eclipsed the 
the death of the 'King of Pop' at the age of 50, research by Global Language 
Monitor (GLM) found. 
Jackson's death received more coverage than the Iraq War, 9/11 and the 
global financial meltdown, last year's Beijing Olympics, Hurricane 
Katrina, the death of Pope John Paul II and the Tsunami. (Telegraph 
2009:2) 
 
This only shows how important are for the media celebrities and how 
important are conflicts happening in Darfur. Death of one famous person 
means more than 800,000 people killed in Rwanda in 1994. According to 
GLM Michael Jackson death locates on the second place for the internet blogs 
and social media stories: 
 
Top internet, blogs and social media stories this century: 
1 President Obama 2008 
2 Michael Jackson's death 2009 
3 Iraq invasion 2003 
4 Beijing Olymipcs 2008 
5 Global financial meltdown 2008 
6 Hurricane Katrina 2005 
7 Pope John Paul II death 2005 
8 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 2001 
9 Asian Tsunami 2005 
(Telegraph 2009:2) 
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Rwanda and Darfur are not even on the list and Tsunami in Asia is on the last 
position. This is very sad because it shows how empty are people who are 
responsible for the decisions of what to put on the main page or how much 
space can be offered for a death of one person or for  a war taking place in 
Africa. However, one aspect that the Telegraph article does not consider is 
that that the expansion of the internet will naturally provide better reporting of 
all events as time passes by. The list reflects this, with more recent events 
generally appearing higher on the list. For example, one of the most 
significant events of this decade, the events of 9/11, appear to score quite low. 
However, the size of the internet has grown hugely since 2001, with the 
concept of the blog coming more fashionable in the last few years.  
When Google first indexed the internet in 1998, it found 26 million pages. 
By 2000, Google indexed one billion web pages. In July 2008, Google has 
found 1 trillion (as in 1,000,000,000,000) unique web pages on the 
internet.(Google blog 2008) 
 As the internet has grown, so has the amount of reported news appearing on 
the internet. The internet would have been in its very beginning during the 
1994 Rwandan genocide and so unsurprisingly does not feature in this list. 
This should be kept in mind when considering these results. 
There are still lot of things that need to be changed in the media. Africa 
should get definitely more coverage as it got until now.  Even though if it is 
far away from Europe it does not have to mean that it should be ignored. If 
the elections in Iran could get so much coverage why Darfur can not receive 
the same? Media can have even bigger influence on the decision making 
process but the chance to make this difference needs to be offered by giving 
more attention by the TV channels, newspapers and internet news websites. 
Journalists are complaining that their work has less effect on the politicians.  
 
The capacity of journalism to move, alarm, shame and stir the public and 
the politicians has, many good journalists say, been diminished. They say 
they find it increasingly difficult to influence policy and politics. (Seaton 
1999:60) 
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 The world needs to open its eyes more to starving, dying people rather to 
funerals of a pop stars. If demand for this kind of information will be bigger 
heads of TV stations will also change the mainstream towards this direction 
and it will be easier for journalists to influence political actors. 
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8. ATTACHMENTS 
 
8.1 Interview Transcript with Nick Robertson 
 
Interview with Nick Robertson 8.08.2008 CNN Office in London Turner 
House, 16 Great Marlborough Street London. 
 
01:52:55 
Ewelina: OK lets start with you, you are a reporter, you have been in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur and Rwanda they are very dangerous places why 
did you decide to do that? You could have said no send somebody else. 
01:53:10 
Nick Robertson: Because I think there are interesting stories there, the stories 
that are important to report I think people should know what is happening and 
I think when you get close to the situation you can find out how dangerous it 
is, what is a dangerous place and than avoid this dangerous place sometimes 
the whole country looks dangerous but when you get there you find the city 
and when you get to the city you find out one part of the city and than you 
find a streets and when you get to the streets you find out which part of the 
street is dangerous so its actually a lot what you can do . 
01:53:43 
E: And when you were doing media coverage in Darfur and Rwanda I saw 
some of your reports, was it very difficult to get to the people to do the 
interviews? 
01:54:04 
N: People  we found in Darfur and Khartoum were very happy to be 
interviewed it was easy to interview them, they wanted to tell us their stories, 
they wanted the world to know, what was happening was to get to them 
because the government officials, you have to have permission, you have to 
have a transport to the camps, you have to go there with people who have 
some responsibility in the camp some A groups perhaps in our case, were the 
people who helped us to get to the camp so getting the story when you get 
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there its easy but getting there its difficult, its difficult before you go to 
country you have to get a visa to go to Sudan and when you got to Sudan you 
have to get to Khartoum and when you get to Khartoum you have to go to 
various government  offices to get permission to go to Darfur and when you 
go to Darfur than you have to go to local,  administrative official of this 
particular area if its north Darfur its ”alfascha” if its west Darfur “aljanina” 
you have to go there and get permission from local official so its not good 
enough to just get Visa for Sudan and its not good enough ti get a paper to go 
to Darfur itself , you than have to get a permission from the local government 
representative and even than they can stop you to go the camp if they want to. 
01:55:22 
E: How does it look from another side, when you want to get a interview with 
somebody from the government, your last interview with Ali Kaschajab a 
janjawed melicia commander was it hard to get him? 
01:55:40 
N: He was reasonably easy to set up an interview with him I don’t know why 
he wanted to talk my guess is that he realizes that there are lot of questions 
raised about what has been done  in the past and he wants to answer them in 
his own way so I think is that’s why he was happy to be interviewed, the 
interior minister was easy to be interviewed but some of the local officials in 
Darfur were harder to set up the interview with one government official in 
Darfur we had three interviews before we actually got him but he just didn’t 
show up. 
 
01:56:15 
E: There are some accusations that the media reacted too late in Darfur and 
in Rwanda that they didn’t learn from their mistakes I have here some dates 
in 2005 the CNN, Fox News, NBC and CBS run 50 times more stories about 
Michael Jackson and 12 times more stories about Tom Cruise as they did 
about genocide in Darfur. My question is from your perspective as a reporter 
do you think that media reacted too late and why was that? 
01:57:32 
N:Ye I think as a journalist you face some difficulties such as number one 
finding out what is happening and in area such as Darfur where only few 
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people can get there its difficult to get a clear picture what is happening and 
when you do get a clear picture , Rwanda was a case of this when you do get 
a clear picture of what is happening  than its imperative is trying to get there 
and obstacles that you face for instance in Darfur is getting permission from 
government  to get there I mean Darfur is horrendously underreported it 
should be on TV much more but you know you have to get the permission to 
get there and the government doesn’t want to see it so its hard to get there. 
Rwanda was a slightly different situation because Rwanda was very 
dangerous to get into and nobody really had a very accurate picture of what 
was happening apart of that there were hundreds thousands people being 
killed and It was not safe to report from there, but where we went to with the 
edges I mean we spent a lot of time in “Goma” covering what was happening 
in Rwanda, I found it very interesting when I was working for CNN in Haiti 
we were covering the landing of US troupes in Haiti it was expected to be 
invasion and than it wasn’t because the president stepped down and than 81 
airborne arrived, CNN had an incredible coverage of that, life pictures of the 
helicopter landing at the airport, within half an hour CNN switchboard 
received  calls from the viewers who wanted to return the coverage  to the 
Kennedy Smith clan which was a trial one of the Kennedy clan involved in a 
rape case at that time so we received a lot of calls from the public that wanted 
to coverage to what they wanted and not what we thought was an important 
international event and as a news organization there is balance is that you are 
fighting against all the time but I can tell you as a journalist you always want 
to be there where the  important  story is and that’s where the human is 
suffering  and that’s where is crisis that s why we sat in border of Rwanda and 
that’s why we go to Darfur and took us 10 moths to get visas but we finally 
get there. 
01:59:57 
E: When was the first time when you went to Darfur? 
01:59:07 
First time when I went to Darfur it was in 2006 but I am one of the number of 
journalist obviously at CNN I mean I don’t get to do everything .When Darfur 
was breaking up war in Iraq was beginning and becoming, getting close to 
happening  and there was lot coverage and I was CNN person in Bagdad  so I 
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was hardly gonnna be a guy and you don’t get visas, you don’t get a visa for 
Iraq  you don’t jump out of Iraq to go to Rwanda you cant get visa in Darfur, 
you don’t get a visa to come back to Iraq and I was there for 4 months 
because of the visa problems again so we did have a people covering Darfur. 
02:00:45 
E: So you were not the only person covering Darfur? 
02:00:49 
N: No, not at all. 
02:00:51 
E: Do you think that the media bare the responsibility for the extend of 
Rwanda and Darfur genocide? 
02:00:59 
N: No I think the people who responsible for the genocide bare the 
responsibility. I think there are governments around the world who knew what 
was going on and I think you can make the case there should be more and 
spedia international intervention, people certainly made the case that the UN 
could have played a stronger role in Rwands for example where they had a 
troops and the General he was very let down by UN and the international 
community I think you can  certainly make a case more could have been done 
in this situations however speaking as a journalist I wouldn’t say that is right 
to attribute the responsibility to journalist, I spent 3 years in Sarajewo 
covering the sieges in Sarajewo and 10.000 people who were killed there that 
was a story that was happening on the fringes of Europe and we had plenty of 
coverage from there, yet the international community  chose to step in when 
they chose to step in by the coverage so I personally would not argue that you 
know report is make a difference on the story 100% but  we don’t make all 
the difference we can tell a story but we will not make people, countries, 
international institutions intervene. 
02:02:37 
E: But do you think if the media coverage have been bigger, don’t you think it 
would have influence on the reaction of international community and some 
countries? 
02:02:50 
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N: I don’t know I mean you are talking here about Rwanda right? Rwanda is 
definitely the case where there was limited media coverage but I don’t think, I 
think people knew what was going on that the people that the killings were 
happening, images were going out, there were some very brave photographs 
Luke Dehay was one of them who managed to get some amazing photographs 
out but Its still took international community time to react I mean three years 
in Bosnia from day one there were pictures of the innocent victims, civilians  
being killed, yet there was not strong enough reaction to stop it or to change 
the international policy it took years and years I think if you know as a 
journalist you hope that what you do, can make a difference you really hope 
what you do can make a difference but it not always translate that way 
02:03:59 
E: That leads me to the next question. As a reporter how do you see yourself 
in raising the awareness of these situations in terms of conflict?  
02:04:11 
N: Well I think we are lucky and privileged as a journalists that our job is to 
watch what is happening around the world and around the corner and you 
know report it to people so that they can be aware of it and if they think its 
important they can lobby their government to do sth about it I think that is the 
responsibility  and as a reporter you are always looking for what stories are 
happening and what injustices are happening and what suffering is happening 
because perhaps your coverage can have an impact on but I don’t think you 
have to go into something  from the outside saying I  go here and stop it I 
think your role and responsibility is to go and report it so that people can 
understand what is happening  so if they chose they can put pressure on the 
government I mean you do get a better understanding of what is happening 
when you are there but this is your job to report it and reflect it accurately for 
people to make their minds up and than if that influence the government to 
stop some suffering than I think you should feel good about what you have 
done 
 02:05:32 
E:The last question is while you were in Darfur, what was the most dangerous 
thing that happened to you, when you life was in danger? 
02:05:50 
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There was a situation two years ago in Darfur, it was a demonstration we 
were with UN representative it was sort of friendly gathering turning to 
demonstration of frustration of being in the refugee camp,  displacement 
camp, most people have been  there for three years and they were just 
incredibly frustrated and becoming politically motivated and active 
particularly the young people in the camp rather sort of traditionally following 
the direction of the oldest they were becoming politically motivated and 
within two seconds a huge amount of anger developed because somebody 
pointed out a translator who had come with this big group of journalist and 
the UN people somebody said this  guy was a spy and he was trying to get 
into our car he was a translator for Oxfam they said he was a government spy 
and he was holding my trousers trying to get into our vehicle and when I 
realized that they were trying to bit him up, than we were trying to pull him 
into vehicle when they were trying to stamp him, I just expected to see blood 
but they missed with the knife and we got him into vehicle and the crowd 
turned wild and had to tell the driver to get out from the situation and he was 
in complete panic cause the car was surrounded by people, the people started 
to stoning  the  vehicle cause they wanted to break threw the windows and 
they started to break some of the windows and than we managed to get the 
driver to actually drive away and the crowd came after us and I thought we 
were lucky to get out of this situation and we almost stopped when we came 
to African Union peacekeepers encampment on the edge of the displacement 
camp and we kind of decided  ok we had some distance between the crowd 
that we must keep going to the nearest town and I am glad we didn’t stop 
cause the crowd get into this African Union compound and killed the 
translator there and they just once they decided they wanted a blood they 
wanted to kill somebody they gonna do it so I felt kind of fearful in that 
situation. 
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8.2 Abstract (English) 
 
The media play an important role in forming government policy, especially in 
international relations, and it influences the decision making process. Jamie 
Metzl, President of the Asia Society, once said ”Mass media reaches not only 
people's homes, but also their minds, shaping their thoughts and sometimes 
their behaviour”. I completely agree with those words. Everybody on this 
planet has contact with the media, such as newspapers, TV and the radio, and 
this includes politicians. This essay attempts to see what kind of influence the 
media have on the decision making process and what role they play? Can they 
save people lives? Taking under consideration the CNN effect, it was proven 
that, to some extent, the media influences political decisions. This can be 
done in a weak or in a strong way, but they always play a role. The two main 
case studies, Darfur and Rwanda, have shown that the media can play a very 
crucial role. One of the reasons why there was no intervention in Rwanda and 
the countries decided to withdraw their soldiers was lack of the coverage there 
and wrong interpretation of the facts. Because the coverage was inconsistent 
in Darfur, it also had less of an influence on the decisions made by the 
politicians. Other examples like Somalia and Iraq in 1991 also showed that 
the media can play very crucial role and that TV pictures can put pressure on 
the decisions made by the head of the states. An example includes the 
decision made by President Bush with respect to intervention in Somalia. This 
paper shows different opinions of different scholars who agree or disagree 
with the statement that the media have a strong influence on the decision 
making process. Furthermore it also shows views of journalists and 
international correspondents. Everything was conducted along with 
qualitative and quantity research. A very important perspective was the 
interview with Nick Robertson from CNN international correspondent who 
was covering Rwanda and Darfur. Thanks to his answers, some things 
became clearer. Other research was conducted using the Lexis-Nexis 
database. It was possible to find how many articles had been published about 
Rwanda during the genocide and about Darfur. Not only English speaking 
newspapers were taken under consideration but also French. The Main part of 
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the paper was a comparison of than Rwanda and Darfur media coverage in 
order to see what has changed since the Rwandan genocide and if the media 
learnt anything from their mistakes. Technology develops very quickly and so 
do the media, so they can make a huge difference in \raising awareness and 
influencing public opinion, which later puts pressure on the politicians. 
 
8.3 Abstract (German) 
 
Die Medien spielen eine wichtige Rolle in der Gestaltung der Politik von 
Regierungen, vor allem in den internationalen Beziehungen, und sie 
beeinflussen den Entscheidungsprozess. Jamie Metzl, Präsident des Asien-
Gesellschaft, meinte einst: " Mass media reaches not only people's homes, but 
also their minds, shaping their thoughts and sometimes their behaviour " Ich 
stimme den Worten zu. Jeder Mensch auf diesem Planeten hat Kontakt mit 
den Medien, wie Zeitungen, Fernsehen und Radio, und dazu gehören auch 
Politiker. Dieser Diplomarbeit versucht bewerten, welche Art von Einfluss die 
Medien auf den Entscheidungsprozess haben und welche Rolle sie spielen? 
Können sie das Leben von Menschen retten? Unter Berücksichtigung des 
CNN-Effekt wurde nachgewiesen, dass bis zu einem gewissen Grad die 
Medien ein Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungen haben. Dieser Einfluss 
kann schwach oder stark sein, aber die Medien spielen immer eine Rolle. Die 
beiden wichtigsten Fallstudien, Darfur und Ruanda zeigen, dass die Medien in 
dert Tat eine ganz entscheidende Rolle spielen. Einer der Gründe, warum es 
keine Intervention in Ruanda gab und die Länder beschlossen haben, ihre 
Soldaten zurückzuziehen, war Abwesenheit der Medien und auch die falsche 
Fakten, die sie gegeben haben. Da die Anwesenheit den Medien in Darfur 
inkonsequent war, hatten sie auch weniger Einfluss auf die Entscheidungen 
der Politiker. Weitere Beispiele wie Somalia und Irak Krieg im Jahr 1991 
haben auch gezeigt, dass die Medien eine entscheidende Rolle spielen und die 
TV-Bilder einen grossen Druck auf die Entscheidungen der Prasidente der 
Staaten haben können. Ein Beispiel könnte die Entscheidung von Präsident 
Bush in Bezug auf die Intervention in Somalia sein. Diese Arbeit zeigt 
unterschiedliche Meinungen verschiedener Wissenschaftler, die die These, 
116 
 
nach der die Medien einen starken Einfluss auf den Entscheidungsprozess 
haben, befürworten oder ablehnen. Darüber hinaus zeigt die Arbeit auch 
Ansichten von Journalisten und internationalen Korrespondenten. Die 
Forschung wurde auf qualitativem und quantitativem Wege betrieben. Eine 
sehr wichtige Perspektive wurde von Nick Robertson gegeben, dem 
internationalen CNN-Korrespondent, der in Ruanda und Darfur arbeitete. 
Dank seiner Antworten, sind einige Dinge klarer geworden. Weitere 
Recherchen wurde mit Hilfe der Lexis-Nexis-Datenbank durchgeführt. Die 
Anzahl der Presseartikel über den Völkermord in Ruanda und über Darfur gab 
Auskunft über das Ausmaß der Berichterstattung zu dem Thema. Nicht nur 
englischsprachige Zeitungen wurden berücksichtigt, sondern auch 
französische Printmedien. Der größte Teil der Arbeit ist ein Vergleich 
zwischen Ruanda und Darfur und wie die Medien diese zwei Völkermorde 
gezeigt haben. Man kann sehen, was sich geändert hat seit dem Völkermord 
in Ruanda, und ob die Medien irgendwas aus ihren Fehlern gelernt haben. 
Technologie entwickelt sich sehr schnell und auch die Medien, und diese 
Entwicklung kann einen riesigen Unterschied machen. Die Medien 
beeinflussen wesentlich das Bewusstsein und die öffentliche Meinung der 
Menschen, die infolge Druck auf die Politiker ausüben. 
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